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JURISPRUDENCE ON PROTECTION OF WEAKER PARTIES IN EUROPEAN CONTRACTS LAW 





With European integration, the European Union Member States are experiencing 
challenges to their national traditions; each Member State understands itself as particular and 
entertains the view that it has a different power dynamic than the average Member State.  The 
creation of European contracts law is the source of one such challenge in that it is believed to 
decrease protection of weaker parties in contracts law in numerous Member States.  Given the 
widespread assumption that contracts laws in the Nordic countries are characterized by welfare 
considerations and paternal motives, the Nordic countries are seen as the most prominent 
examples for which protection is believed to decrease.  By considering Nordic contracts laws in 
the context of globalizations of law and legal thought, this article identifies the historical reasons 
and sources for this prevailing assumption and reconsiders the true impact of European 
contracts law in the Nordic countries.  Specifically, this article shows that the Nordic countries 
have been able to postpone many legislative choices necessary for harmonization based on their 
concerns over a decrease in protection for weaker parties and the prevailing assumption about 
their welfare-laden laws; in doing so, the Nordic countries are acting to protect their national 
traditions from the reach of European integration.  In the end, this article argues that there is 




From the outside, European integration appears to proceed without complications; the 
European Union (“EU”) recently joined ten new Member States, the European Community 
(“EC”) is progressing toward adoption of a directive on services in the common market, and the 
EC is soon to adopt a common reference framework on contracts law.1  This article, however, 
                                                 
* S.J.D. Candidate at Duke Law School, LL.M. in American Law from Boston University School of Law, and Jur. 
Kand. from Göteborgs Universitet.  The article was written while a Visiting Researcher at the European Law 
Research Center, Harvard Law School, during 2004-2006.  I am very thankful for the support and feedback of 
Daniela Caruso, Duncan Kennedy, Ulf Bernitz, Hugo Ahlberg, and Carlye Murphy.  Errors are mine alone. 
1 See European Commission, Enlargement, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2006); 
European Commission, Proposal for a Directive on Services in the Internal Market, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/services/services-dir/index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2006); European 
Commission, Towards a European Contracts Law, 157, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/socio_economic_research/docs/FP6_synopsis_en.pdf  (last visited 
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probes the ongoing debate of harmonization of contracts law within the European Union, and 
finds that European integration causes numerous disturbances to Member States’ legal systems 
including, of particular concern for this article, the Nordic legal systems.2  Instead of assigning 
these disturbances to differences among the different Member States’ legal systems and legal 
cultures, the analysis in this article looks at European integration through a framework of legal 
theory, specifically, the concept that there is an ongoing globalization of law and legal thought.3  
This article shows how European integration represents the reception of this ongoing 
globalization in the Nordic countries and, in doing so, traces the disturbances experienced in the 
Nordic countries to a misreading of and resistance to the globalization.   
When the EC first began harmonizing national law in the 1950s, harmonization efforts 
concentrated predominantly on public law and thus left private law and public law distinct within 
the harmonization process.4  It was not until 1985 that the EC took the first steps toward 
                                                                                                                                                             
Oct. 20, 2006).  With “EU,” I refer to the European Union as a whole, whereas “EC”—the European Community—
represents the area in which the EU has legislative powers.   
2 The Nordic legal systems refer to the legal systems in the Nordic countries.  Denmark, Finland, and Sweden all are 
members of the EU.  Although they are not members of the EU, Iceland and Norway also are included in this article 
because the EU closely affects these nations through their membership in the European Free Trade Association and 
the European Economic Area agreement.  I should emphasize that my main source of knowledge is of Swedish 
origin.  Most examples concerning national provisions, case law, and politics in this article are Swedish.  However, I 
try to broaden my perspective to the group of Nordic countries as much as possible.  Of course, in applying this 
model to other Nordic countries, one runs the risk of over-generalizing.  My knowledge of political events in those 
countries is relatively limited and it is only as an outside spectator from which I draw my conclusions.  Nevertheless, 
with this caveat in mind, I argue that there are strong similarities in the Nordic countries and that they all are facing 
similar challenges. 
3 See Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631, 638 
(2003). 
4 Private law describes horizontal law, law concerning civil parties’ interaction.  For example, contracts, property, 
and torts laws are private law.  Public law refers to cases concerning vertical relationships, when citizens interact 
legally with public institutions.  In Sweden, the distinction between private law and public law dates back to 1789, 
when King Gustav III created the Supreme Court and granted it jurisdiction over private law cases.  An 
administrative agency, “Rikets Allmänna Ärenders Beredning,” was left with jurisdiction over public law cases.  
GÖRAN INGER, SVENSK RÄTTSHISTORIA, 155-56 (Malmö, Liber Ekonomi, 1997).  The distinction later inspired the 
continued development of two independent court systems in Sweden and Finland: administrative courts and general 
courts.  See ULF BERNITZ, EUROPEAN LAW IN SWEDEN: ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND ROLE IN MARKET AND CONSUMER 
LAW, 18 (Stockholm, Juridiska fakulteten vid Stockholms universitet, 2002).  Today administrative courts handle 
cases concerning public law including, for example, tax law, social security law, and treatment of the mentally ill.  
General courts, on the other hand, handle cases concerning horizontal relationships—criminal cases and cases 
between private parties, i.e. private law.  In contrast, Norway and Denmark each have a single court system.  One 
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harmonizing private law, and still today the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) remains reluctant 
to expand the doctrine of direct effect horizontally.5   
In the 1990s, some scholars identified Member States’ ability to retain control over 
private law as one of the main reasons for the success of European integration.6  The scholars 
pointed out that throughout the foundational phases of the integration project, which spanned 
almost three decades, Member States remained in control of private law.  During this period, the 
true effects of European integration on the essence of domestic legal discourse were not 
apparent.7  Governments’ powers seemed intact at the core.8  The picture is radically different 
today.9  The harmonization of private law is now openly on the agenda of EC institutions, and, to 
the interest of this article, a European contracts law is in the making.10
Throughout Europe, the pros and cons of a comprehensive European contracts law are 
subjects of contemporary discourse.  One important issue in the ongoing discussion is what 
effects such a contracts law would have on Member States’ legal systems; so far, problems have 
                                                                                                                                                             
can distinguish, however, between public and private law in all of the Nordic countries.  Historically, the 
administrative courts have been more involved in applying EC law and referring cases to the ECJ.  See Ulf Bernitz, 
Sweden and the European Union: On Sweden’s Implementation and Application of European Law, 38 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 903, 923 (2001). 
5 See infra note 291.  The doctrine of “direct effect” gives unimplemented EC directives effect after the expiration of 
the implementation deadline.  Article 94 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (“TEC”) defines 
directives as legislative acts adopted by the Council for the approximation of laws, regulations, or administrative 
provisions.  See Article 94, TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 
[hereinafter TEC].  A directive is a flexible regulatory instrument that binds Member States to a particular goal but 
leaves Member States to choose how to attain that goal.  The direct effect doctrine only binds Member States as 
public entities—so-called vertical direct effect.  Private parties are not required to comply with directive norms that 
the legislature has failed to implement—so-called horizontal direct effect.  Horizontal direct effect has not been 
established as a matter of EC law.  See generally Daniela Caruso, The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private 
Law Paradigm of European Legal Integration, 3 EUR. L. J. 6, 25ff (March 1997); but cf. Report from the 
Commission on the implementation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC (2000) 248, infra note 323, at 14 (In 1997, the 
Spanish Supreme Court applied an unimplemented Directive to a case concerning private parties, and thereby took 
the first steps introducing horizontal direct effect). 
6 See Caruso, supra note 5, at 4.  
7 See JOSEPH WEILER, THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE (New Haven, Yale Law Journal Co. 1991). 
8 See id. 
9 See Daniela Caruso, Private Law and Public Stakes in European Integration: The Case of Property, 10 EUR. L. J. 
751 (2004). 
10 See infra note 285. 
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primarily been identified in connection with the diverse regimes of domestic contracts law 
dealing with the protection of weaker parties.11  Many scholars assign these problems to 
differences in Member States’ legal systems and legal cultures.  On the one hand, some Member 
States think contracts law is best left alone, and these nations avoid regulating protection of 
weaker parties.  On the other hand, some Member States employ truly interventionist and 
paternalist systems to contract relations.  The scholars believe that harmonizing contracts law 
decreases the protection of weaker parties provided for in the law—at least for those states that 
historically have allowed for intervention.  The Nordic countries are held out as the most 
prominent example of countries for which protection is believed to decrease.  Nordic contracts 
laws feature many social considerations and provides for court intervention to protect weaker 
parties—i.e., Nordic contracts laws contain numerous “welfarism” concerns, where welfarism 
represents “rules and principles protecting the weaker party to a contract.”12   
However, there is reason to question whether harmonizing contracts law actually 
decreases protection of weaker parties.  In 2002, the ECJ decided the case Commission v. 
Sweden.13  The Commission brought the case before the Court because of Sweden’s non-
implementation—so the Commission argued—of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.14  
Sweden had kept its regime providing for protection of weaker parties intact, making only 
minimal changes to the relevant contracts law provisions.  There are two intrinsic points to be 
                                                 
11 See generally id.; Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in 
New Divergences, 61 M. L. REV. 11 (1998); Thomas Wilhelmsson, Varieties of Welfarism in European Contract 
Law, 10 EUR. L. J. 712 (2004). 
12 Thomas Wilhelmsson, The Philosophy of Welfarism and its Emergence in the Modern English Contract Law, in 
BROWNSWORD, R., G. G. HOWELLS, WELFARISM IN CONTRACT LAW, 71 (Aldershot, Hants; Brookfield, Vt., 
Dartmouth et al. 1994) (In the first parts of the article, Wilhelmsson discusses different definitions of welfarism and 
their application); see also Wilhelmsson, supra note 11. 
13 Case C-478/99, Commission v. Kingdom of Sweden, 2002 E.C.R. I-04147 (1999). 
14 Counsel Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC) available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31993L0013:EN:HTML [hereinafter Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive]. 
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made here.  First, the Swedish implementation of the Directive was part of a common Nordic 
effort.15  Second, the Directive only provided for a minimum level of protection of weaker 
parties, leaving the Member States with the option of having stricter protection; one would 
expect, therefore, the Directive to cause no changes to the progressive Nordic legal systems.16  
Although Sweden—and the Nordic countries—prevailed in the case, there is nonetheless strong 
support for the Commission’s claim that the Nordic countries’ implementation did not meet the 
level required by the Directive.  Indisputably, Commission v. Sweden challenges the claim that 
protection of weaker parties will decrease in the Nordic countries.   
Consequently, differences between Member States’ legal systems and legal cultures are 
not likely the cause of the problems experienced in connection with contracts law regimes 
protecting weaker parties.  An analysis of European integration through a framework of legal 
theory thus is useful.  Building upon Duncan Kennedy’s work on globalizations of law and legal 
thought,17 this article contrasts the historical development of Nordic contracts laws from the 
nineteenth century onwards, with the reception of law and legal thought from the centers of legal 
development.  This description provides a national perspective where intervention in contracts 
law increased over time.  The prevailing understanding is that Nordic contracts laws are full of 
paternalist motives, informalities, and social conceptualism.  At the same time, the article offers 
a global perspective in which the Nordic countries receive globalizations of law and legal 
thought.18  This analysis demonstrates how European integration represents part of the latest of 
these globalizations, which encompasses economic and political formalism.19  Economic 
formalism embodies both an increased interest with freedom of contracts brought about by 
                                                 
15 See infra at note 343. 
16 See infra at note 346. 
17 Duncan Kennedy is a Professor at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, United States.  See Kennedy, supra note 3. 
18 See id. 
19 See generally id. 
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European contracts law and the creation of protection of human and property rights resulting 
from the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“European Convention”) into law.20  Political formalism, on the other hand, embodies 
judicial supremacy and federalism introduced by means of the European Community Treaty and 
the acquis communautaire.21
It is against this background that this article proceeds to look at the consequences within 
the Nordic legal systems of the ongoing globalization of law and legal thought.  The 
globalization causes numerous disturbances to the Nordic legal systems.  With European 
contracts law, the Nordic legislatures are ceding formal legislative powers to the EC legislature 
and to federal and national courts, whereas Nordic courts must accept the ECJ as the supreme 
norm creator and interpreter.  Additionally, both the legislatures and the courts fear for the 
uniqueness of the Nordic legal systems—its realist characteristics and discourses, its 
informalities, and its high level of social conceptualism.   
Because of these disturbances, Nordic legal institutions strive to preserve the Nordic legal 
systems’ characteristics whenever they are incorporating EC law.  Indeed, these disturbances are 
the reason why, within Nordic legal debate, all arguments and claims originate from 
presumptions that the Nordic legal systems represent informalities or intervention and that the 
EU represents formalism or economic liberalism.  More specifically, Nordic legal debate 
perceives Nordic contracts laws to represent paternalistic intervention and European contracts 
law to represent economic liberalism.  For instance, depending on political biases, scholars 
describe Nordic contracts laws in terms of, on the one hand, flexibility and redistribution and, on 
                                                 
20 See id.; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950 (ETS 
No. 5), 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 1950 entered into force Sept. 3, 1953 [hereinafter European Convention]. 
21 See Kennedy, supra note 3; TEC, supra note 5.  The acquis communautaire is the product of the body of treaties 
and directives and their common interpretation by the ECJ. 
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the other hand, informality and excessive intervention; and European contracts law in terms of, 
on the one hand, legal certainty and efficiency and, on the other hand, stagnation and formalism.   
This dichotomized set of presumptions about European contracts law, until now, has 
mitigated the true impact of harmonization of contracts law in the Nordic countries and has 
allowed postponement of the many legislative choices made necessary by the harmonization. 
 Part I of this article begins by presenting an analytic framework based on Kennedy’s 
theory on globalization of law and legal thought, focusing on the three globalizations that have 
occurred since the nineteenth century, their characteristics, and their principal contents.22  In Part 
II, this article gives a historical description of contracts law in the Nordic countries.  The analytic 
framework developed in Part I provides a global perspective.  The Nordic countries are in receipt 
of—and inspired by—the globalization movements at the core of legal development.   
Part III analyzes the relevant EC legislation on contracts law—namely, the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive.23  As the contours of European contracts law form, Part III discusses 
its relation to Nordic contracts laws.  The findings include differences in legislative techniques 
and in legislative policy.  Part III shows how European contracts law includes more formalist 
clauses, grants more rights, and focuses policy more on information and individualism than 
Nordic contracts laws.  Part IV compares the Nordic and European contracts laws and explains 
the effect of incorporating European contracts law into the Nordic legal systems.  In particular, 
Part IV studies Commission v. Sweden, decided by the ECJ in 2002, which brings to light the 
conflicts between the Nordic legislatures and EC institutions, mainly the Commission and the 
ECJ.24   
                                                 
22 See Kennedy, supra note 3. 
23 See Unfair Contract Terms Directive, supra note 14. 
24 See Commission v. Sweden, supra note 13. 
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In Part V, this article presents an alternative explanation of the problems of 
harmonization of contracts law experienced in Nordic legal systems, connecting the historical 
description of Nordic contracts laws, European contracts law, and European integration with the 
theory of globalizations presented in Part I.  In so doing, this article traces the disturbances 
experienced in the Member States to the ongoing globalization.  Furthermore, Part V shows how 
Nordic legal debate works to mitigate the true impact and resist the implications of European 
contracts law, and, finally, Part VI presents a conclusion based upon the findings in this article. 
I. GLOBALIZATIONS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 
In his more recent works, Kennedy presents a theory about the globalization of law and 
legal thought.25  Kennedy identifies and tracks the developments of legal theory in the core, 
analyzes how these developments globalize and, ultimately, describes the reception of these 
developments in the periphery.  Of importance to this article are the globalizations of Classical 
Legal Thought, The Social, and the Third Globalization.26   
Classical Legal Thought is what Kennedy identifies as the first globalization, comprising 
a combination of individualism and deduction.27  More specifically, what globalized with 
Classical Legal Thought was the idea that the legal system has a strongly coherent internal 
structure—based on Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s (1779-1861) theories on legal systems—and 
the will theory.28   
                                                 
25 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 637; see also Duncan Kennedy, The Rise & Fall of Classical Legal Thought 
(AFAR, Cambridge, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) [hereinafter The Rise & Fall of 
Classical Legal Thought). 
26 See id. 
27 The globalization of Classical Legal Thought stretched from the mid-nineteenth century until the end of the First 
World War.  See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 637; see also Kennedy, The Rise & Fall of Classical Legal Thought, 
supra note 25. 
28 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 637. 
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Savigny believed that normative orders are coherent systems, building upon the spirit and 
history of a specific people.29  According to him, positive legal rules can be created and derived 
from a system’s internal coherence.30  This produced a strong sense of tradition, authority, and 
patriarchy.31  Legal scientists and law professors were the main actors in the process of 
constructing coherent systems.32  In Germany, for example, followers of Savigny—the Historical 
School—inspired the adoption of the German Civil Code of 1900.33   
The other notion of Classical Legal Thought, the will theory, tried to identify and derive 
rules from the idea of individual self-realization.34  Accordingly, governments should be 
concerned with the rights of legal entities, allowing them freedom to realize their individual will 
and intervening only to assure that others can do the same.35   
Kennedy identifies the emergence of a critique toward the inherent logic and deduction of 
Classical Legal Thought to avoid a social crisis stemming from a few dominating the many.36  
Whereas the logic was “inherently individualist in legal substance,” it had limited reach—it 
could not safeguard social concerns.37  In the latter part of the nineteenth century, social reality 
was at focus and the new socio-economic maxim of interdependence became predominant.38  
Everywhere in society, there were reminders of the countless examples of extreme outcomes and 
inequalities stemming from Classical Legal Thought’s inability to regard the changing factors of 
                                                 
29 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 638; see also INGER, supra note 4, at 165. 
30 See id. 
31 See INGER, supra note 4, at 165. 
32 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 638 
33 See id. 
34 See id.  
35 See id. 
36 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 648.  Rudolf von Jhering (1818-1892) played a major role in formulating this 
critique, which globalized between 1900 and 1968.  See id.; RUDOLPH VON JEHRING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW 
(1879). 
37 Kennedy, supra note 3, at 648 (quotations omitted). 
38 See id. (interdependence represented a social transformation, comprising industrialization, globalization, and 
urbanization). 
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society.  Industrial accidents, failing factories, and emerging urban slums all were attributed to 
the will theory’s inability to respond to social needs.39   
The critique of Classical Legal Thought took the form of The Social.40  This does not 
mean that the critique was necessarily Socialist; instead, The Social connotes a way of thinking 
concerned with how to use law to achieve social objectives.41  From describing the problem of 
Classical Legal Thought and of what “is,” The Social continued and developed what “ought” to 
exist.42  Everything, from unfair contract practices, labor legislation, rent and housing laws, and 
zoning to intervention in financial markets, was considered a legitimate purpose.43  Within 
general contracts law, The Social shifted the focus from the subjective intention, i.e. the free will 
of the parties, to predefined objective functions in an effort to avoid unfair results.44   
Politically, The Social could take the form of Socialism, Nationalism, Authoritarianism, 
or Fascism.45  The Social was, however, always both anti-Marxist and anti-laissez-faire.46  
Whatever its political shape, The Social advocated the same language of “organicism, purpose, 
function, reproduction, welfare, [and] instrumentalism.”47   
Most recently, and all around us, the Third Globalization exists.48  What is globalizing is 
not an all-new comprehensive legal theory, nor is it a synthesis from what was before.49  Rather, 
the Third Globalization is the “un-synthesized coexistence” of The Social and Classical Legal 
                                                 
39 See id. at 649. 
40 See id. at 648.  The Social is the term used by Kennedy in his scholarship to describe this era. 
41 See id. at 633. 
42 Id. at 650.  Different organized interests as well as the public interest worked in harmony to maximize social 
welfare, and the result was legal rules derived from “social needs or functions or purposes.”  Kennedy, supra note 3, 
at 653, 672. 
43 See id. at 650. 
44 See Fernanda Nicola, Asymmetry and Distribution in European Contract Law, 35 (S.J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law 
School, 2004) (on file with the author). 
45 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 650. 
46 See id. at 649. 
47 Id. at 650. 
48 See id. at 674. 
49 See id. 
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Thought.50  Elements from those theories transformed or survived and now surround us.51  
Neither Classical Legal Thought nor The Social thus has ceased to exist. 
In the way The Social stemmed from a critique of Classical Legal Thought, the Third 
Globalization grew out of a critique of The Social.  From the 1930s on, with a peak in 1968, the 
critique has visualized the many problems of The Social.52  Four main critiques exist.   
First, The Social bases its is-to-ought constructions of legal rules on meta-physical 
concepts.53  One cannot derive rules from social needs, functions, or purposes, without denying 
the invasive conflict between different functions.54  Second, critics gave much attention to the 
link between The Social and extreme political systems; Fascism is a prime example.55  Third, the 
critique that had the most impact addressed the lack of formalism in The Social as informalities 
of The Social opened the way for governments to tangle with individual rights.56  Arbitrariness 
and authoritarian elements permeated government institutions and administration.57  Finally, 
there were many claims concerning social institutions’ tendency to damage the interests they 
aimed to protect.58  For instance, one claim was that redistribution of wealth from the middle 
classes to the lower classes stagnated economic growth.59  Another example was that people 
received social protection that was worth less than the price increase the protective measures 
                                                 
50 Kennedy, supra note 3, at 674.  Modeer draws a similar conclusion in his book, Historiska Rättskällor.  He 
recognizes the reemergence in Swedish jurisprudence of what he calls natural law as a consequence of European 
influence in Sweden.  KJELL A MODEER, HISTORISKA RÄTTSKÄLLOR: EN INTRODUKTION I RÄTTSHISTORIA, 236 
(Stockholm, Nerenius & Santerus Förlag, 1997); Håkan Strömberg, Tankar om naturrättens renässans, I: Svensk 
Juristtidning 1996, s. 635 ff. 
51 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 674. 
52 See id. at 671. 
53 See id. at 672. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. at 672-73. 
57 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 672-73. 
58 See id. at 674. 
59 See id. 
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caused in the market.60  This critique found that weaker parties would be better off without The 
Social, social engineering, and state services. 
As the critiques against The Social gained strength, the Third Globalization embraced 
The Social, which had now transformed into policy analysis—also described as conflicting 
considerations or balancing.61  Policy analysis enabled courts to strike a balance between 
different “interests,” “values,” and “utilities” that had a stake in the outcome.62  In contrast to the 
earlier mode, when rules had been created with a particular purpose in a coherent legal system, 
policy analysis allowed creation of rules from ad hoc compromises.63   
Similarly, Classical Legal Thought formalism transformed into a new shape and re-
emerged as neo-formalism,64 introducing human rights, contracts and property rights, federalism, 
and judicial supremacy.65  Rule of law limited the executive and legislative branches of 
government through judicial supremacy, and courts grew to be the arbitrators.66  Once again, it 
was possible to deduce rights and rules from an imaginary coherent system of positive law,67 the 
best example of which was the emergence of the extensive and widely used regime of human 
rights.68
                                                 
60 See id. 
61 See id. at 671, 676.  See also Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or 
Max Weber's Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L. J. 
1031 (2004) (for more on policy analysis). 
62 Kennedy, The Rise & Fall of Classical Legal Thought, supra note 25, at 251 (the point is that none of the different 
criteria may be used to construct a principle; they are all choices between “natural rights/morality and social welfare 
maximization.”). 
63 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 675. 
64 See id. at 671, 676. 
65 See id. at 634, 674. 
66 See id. at 634.  Both policy analysis and neo-formalism perceived the judge as the central figure.  It is he or she 
who makes the ad hoc compromises in each case and at the same time protects rights and formalities.  See id. at 677. 
67 See id. at 674. 
68 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 674-75. 
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II. PROTECTION OF WEAKER PARTIES IN NORDIC CONTRACTS LAWS   
 Nordic legal unity stems from the Nordic countries’ common legal theory and 
methodology, because all Nordic countries share basic legal concepts, have alike legal sources, 
and incorporate the doctrine of precedent.69  Other notable characteristics are the many 
sociological and political correspondences between the Nordic countries; they all share similar 
“intentions, language and welfare.”70   
Most comparative studies perceive the Nordic legal systems as distinguishable from both 
Civil and Common Law legal systems.71  Zweigert and Kötz observe in their book, An 
Introduction to Comparative Law, that Nordic law is “not completely civil – not common law.”72  
Although historically the Nordic legal systems have had close ties to the Civil Law tradition, one 
can find general Common Law features in, for example, securities and property law, which 
developed almost entirely by case law, analogies, and scholarship.73   
From a contracts law perspective, what characterize the Nordic legal systems are “the 
lack in Nordic law of large, systematically constructed private law codifications” and the 
frequent use of analogies when no applicable statutory law exists.74   
A. Emerging Welfarism and Classical Legal Thought 
 The Nordic countries traditionally work together to find common legal solutions.  
Cooperation takes place both on a formal and on an informal level, from private phone calls 
                                                 
69 See BERNITZ, supra note 4, at 97. 
70 K. ZWEIGERT & H. KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW, 294-95 (Oxford New York, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford University Press, 3d ed., 1998). 
71 Recent comparative studies describe the Nordic legal systems as a sub group to the continental Civil Law legal 
system.  See BERNITZ, supra note 4, at 20 (citing MICHAEL BOGDAN, KOMPARATIV RÄTTSKUNSKAP, 91 (Stockholm, 
Norstedts juridik, 1993). 
72 ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 70, at 287. 
73 See BERNITZ, supra note 4, at 17. 
74 Ulf Bernitz, Nordic Legislature Cooperation in the New Europe, 39 SC. ST. L. 29, 32 (2000). 
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between officials to public meetings.75  Nordic cooperation dates back to 1872 when Nordic 
lawyers and scholars gathered in a formal meeting to exchange ideas on legal issues.76  Other 
meetings followed and, in time, the meetings became institutionalized.77   
At first, efforts were concentrated on areas concerning trade law.78  However, 
cooperation has since expanded to areas such as family law, intellectual property law, and laws 
of inheritance.79  This has produced a number of essentially identical laws throughout the Nordic 
countries; similarities exist both on a material level and in how the Nordic countries apply these 
laws.  Currently, the Nordic countries arrange “Meetings of Nordic Jurists” once every three 
years.80   
In the context of contracts law, one can trace common Nordic features back to the early 
twentieth century.  Between 1905 and 1907, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark adopted common 
acts on Sale of Goods.81  At the time of enactment, the controlling law in Sweden was the Trade 
Code from 1734,82 which most critics held as outdated and insufficient.83  In terms of regulating 
contracts law, the Purchase and Exchange of Goods Acts changed little, and a significant 
addendum to and improvement of the Purchase and Exchange of Goods Acts and of contracts 
                                                 
75 See generally INGER, supra note 4, at 171, 180, 253; MODEER, supra note 50, at 225-26. 
76 See MODEER, supra note 50, at 200. 
77 See id. at 200-01, 224-26.  Note that Finland was not part of the Nordic cooperation until 1918, when it received 
independence from Russia.  See INGER, supra note 4, at 181. 
78 See INGER, supra note 4, at 180. 
79 See id. at 180-181. 
80 See id.; see also Meetings of Nordic Jurists, Reykjavik, Iceland, at http://www.congress.is/njm2005/ (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2006); Meetings of Nordic Jurists, Helsinki, Finland, at http://www.congrex.fi/njm2002/indexs.htm (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2006).  In 1962, Nordic legislative cooperation formalized as the Nordic countries came together to 
reinforce their commitment to cooperate.  The Helsinki Agreement was entered into that same year.  It expressed a 
clear ambition to continue Nordic legislative cooperation in order “to attain the greatest uniformity possible in 
private law.”  See The Helsinki Agreement, Article 4, available at http://www.norden.org/avtal/helsingfors/sk/3-2-2-
hfors.asp (translated by the author) (last visited Oct. 20, 2006). 
81 See Köp och byte av varor [Purchase and Exchange of Goods], see generally INGER, supra note 4, at 180.  
82 Handelsbalk [Trade Code], SFS 1736:0123 2 (Sweden). 
83 See INGER, supra note 4, at 220-21. 
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law came with the new Contracts Acts.84  Between 1915 and 1936, all Nordic countries adopted 
the new Contracts Acts.85  The Acts mostly were an effort to put into statute what already was 
governing case law, but new aspects included honesty and fair dealing in contract relationships.86
From a global perspective, Classical Legal Thought strongly influenced Nordic contracts 
laws and the adoption of the Contract Acts.  The Act represented the success of the will theory in 
Nordic contracts laws, emphasizing the rights of legal entities and scientifically construed after 
the positivist German model of “normative formalism.”87  The Contracts Acts also were in step 
with the general laissez-faire tendencies of society.88   
Central to the Contracts Acts was the principle of freedom of contract.  For instance, 
section 1, paragraph 1, of the Swedish version of the Contracts Act made offers to contract 
binding.89  The contracting parties decided the extent of their contractual relationship through 
offer and acceptance, and the Government upheld their will to contract as long as it could 
identify a formal offer to contract—the promise made by the offeror was one that the 
Government thought should be enforceable.90
Moreover, section 1, paragraph 2, of the Contracts Act established that when commercial 
practices or a practice between the involved parties entail a custom that the parties and the courts 
regard as binding on the parties, that custom should have precedence over formal requirements in 
                                                 
84 See id.  In a case from 1901, the Swedish Supreme Court expressed its desire for an all-purpose Contracts Act.  
NJA 1901:1, at 6-9, 20ff (Sweden). 
85 Sweden 1915, Denmark 1917, Norway 1918, Finland 1919, and Iceland 1936.  See Wilhelmsson, supra note 12, 
at 70-71. 
86 See INGER, supra note 4, at 221. 
87 Kennedy, supra note 3, at 631, 638; see also INGER, supra note 4, at 181; BERNITZ, supra note 4, at 19; 
Wilhelmsson, supra note 12, at 70-71. 
88 Liberals believed that free competition stimulated societies’ economic development.  State intervention was 
dangerous and should be limited to the greatest extent.  See generally INGER, supra note 4, at 164-65. 
89 See Lag om Avtal och andra rättshandlingar på förmögenhetsrättens område [Contracts Act], SFS 1915:218, 
section 1 (Sweden) [hereinafter Contracts Act]. 
90 Exceptions to the general rule that offers to contract are enforceable promises were found in other laws.  See id. at 
section 1, para. 3.  In comparison, American contracts law from this time required consideration for a contract to be 
binding.  Consideration represented the Government’s opinion on which promises should be enforceable.  See 
Kennedy, The Rise & Fall of Human Thought, supra note 25, at 215. 
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the Act.91  Of course, an explicit agreement between the parties also would have precedence.92  
Freedom of contract thus was negatively legislated; it was the underlying presumption.93  The 
law allowed parties to develop their own norms through trade practice, and courts upheld those 
norms.94  
Another example of the importance of the will theory in Nordic law can be found outside 
the Contract Acts.  Sweden has strongly relied on the principle of extinction.  According to that 
principle, restated in among others the Promissory Notes Act (1936), a buyer who purchases 
stolen property in good faith prevails over the original owner by extinguishing the original 
owner’s right to the property.95  The idea is that good faith buyers should be able to rely on the 
enforceability of a contract to buy property, thereby increasing willingness to contract.  Only in 
July 2003 did the Swedish legislature change this rule toward the prevailing principle elsewhere 
in the EU, which holds that the original owner’s right prevails over a good faith buyer’s right.96  
In sum, the Nordic legislatures sought different ways to retain a very high degree of contractual 
freedom and to avoid interfering in market transactions.   
Classical Legal Thought also had an impact on how to provide for protection of weaker 
parties; the Contract Acts limited intervention in contract relationships to the securing of each 
entity’s individual will through regulating the form and procedure, rather than the substance, of 
contract formation.97  When the Acts allowed for intervention in substance, specifically section 
33 of the Act, it limited intervention to invalidating contracts “contrary to good faith and 
                                                 
91 See Contracts Act, supra note 89, sec. 1. 
92 See id. 
93 See LARS ERIK TAXELL, AVTALSRÄTT: BAKGRUND, SAMMANFATTNING, UTBLICK, 36 (Stockholm, Juristförl., 
1997). 
94 For a comprehensive discussion, see BERNITZ, supra note 4, at 285ff. 
95 See Lag om Skuldebrev [Promissory Notes Act], SFS 1936:81 (Sweden) [hereinafter Promissory Notes Act]. 
96 See Lag om Godtrosförvärv av Lösöre [Good Faith Acquisition of Goods Act], SFS 1986:796 (Sweden). 
97 See Claes Sandgren, En social avtalsrätt? Del I, 4 JT 456, 461 (1992-1993) (Sweden); see also Kennedy, supra 
note 3, at 637.  
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honesty.”98  Accordingly, a contracting party had no obligation to take into consideration the 
other party’s will.  This image assumed that all contracting parties had equal social and economic 
power and, therefore, that parties could look after their own interests.99  The widespread use of 
the caveat emptor principle strengthened the presumption that contracting parties were informed 
and rational actors.100   
In sum, contracts law from this period was shaped by the perception that the market was 
best left alone.  Consequently, the Contract Acts contained no specific welfarist goals, only a 
mutually recognized respect of each party’s will and a limited call for morality in the market.101  
Thomas Wilhelmsson, Professor at Helsinki University in Finland, categorizes the welfarist 
provisions in the Contract Acts as representing an “emerging welfarism.”102
B. The Civil Code Discussion 
Both the French and German civil codes greatly inspired Nordic countries throughout the 
nineteenth century, and Sweden entertained the option of adopting a civil code in the early 
nineteenth century, when the French adopted their Code Civil.103  In fact, the Government’s 
working committee presented a draft, Civillagsförslaget, in 1826.104  Critics, mainly 
conservatives, opined that a civil code would be “unduly radical.”105  Following Savigny, they 
argued that codification would upset the history and tradition of the people.106  The Supreme 
                                                 
98 Wilhelmsson, supra note 12, at 73 (discussing the Contracts Act, supra note 89, sec. 33). 
99 E.g. Prop. [Legislative note] 1994/95:17, 16 (Sweden). 
100 See generally Wilhelmsson, supra note 12, at 72.  Caveat emptor is Latin for “let the buyer beware.”  The buyer 
takes responsibility for the condition of the goods involved in the transaction.  The opposite doctrine is caveat 
vendor, meaning “let the seller beware.”  Marriam-Webster Online, at www.m-w.com (last visited Aug. 2006). 
101 The call for morality in contract relations, though limited in its reach, was a development from existing case law 
and the Trade Code [Handelsbalken 1734].  This supports Wilhelmsson’s categorization of this historical period as 
emerging welfarism.  See Wilhelmsson, supra note 12, at 86.  For a similar claim, see INGER, supra note 4, at 221. 
102 Wilhelmsson, supra note 12, at 86. 
103 See BERNITZ, supra note 4, at 17.  France adopted its Code Civil in 1804.  See Wikipedia, at 
http://en.wikipedia.ord/wiki/Napoleonic_Code (last visited Oct. 21, 2006). 
104 See INGER, supra note 4, at 176.  
105 BERNITZ, supra note 4, at 17; see also INGER, supra note 4, at 176. 
106 E.g. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 638. 
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Court, at the time charged with the responsibility of reviewing proposed laws, dismissed the code 
in 1833107 and, hence, the code was never presented to the Parliament for voting.108  No Nordic 
country adopted a civil code, choosing instead to focus legislative efforts on particular legal 
sectors and the use of analogy when no applicable rule exists.109  The Nordic Contract Acts only 
consisted of around thirty sections.110  
C. Reactive Welfarism and The Social 
 At the end of the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century, governments all 
over the world experienced increasing numbers of market failures and, like in many other places, 
governments in the Nordic countries looked to activist state action in the form of reconstruction 
programs as a counter measure.  Otto von Bismarck’s German welfare model especially 
influenced the establishment of Nordic welfare states.111   
Inspired by its German counterpart, social democracy grew as a political force; it was a 
movement to reform society through democratic rather than revolutionary means.112  Large parts 
of the growing working class were excluded, however, from democratic influence, because of 
restrictions that based voting rights on gender and property.113  As a result, in Sweden, the period 
                                                 
107 See MODEER, supra note 50, at 176-78.  The Supreme Court performed judicial preview to establish whether a 
proposed law was constitutional.  See id. at 177; infra note 259. 
108 The Parliament did vote, however, on one part of the proposed code, the Criminal Act, which eventually was 
adopted.  See INGER, supra note 4, at 177. 
109 See BERNITZ, supra note 4, at 17, 99; see also Wilhelmsson, supra note 12, at 85 n.15 (the Nordic countries 
denied the idea of a “sacrosanct” general code). 
110 See Bernitz, supra note 4, at 99-100. 
111 See Gregory S. Alexander, Comparing the Two Realisms – American and Scandinavian, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 131, 
174 (Winter 2002); INGER, supra note 4, at 224; see also Kennedy, supra at note 3, at 665-66.  Between the years 
1883 to 1889, Germany introduced a social insurance program for workers—providing for a mandatory health 
insurance, accident insurance and a disability- and retirement insurance.  The Swedish parliament entertained the 
same possibility in 1884, but in the end, decided that it was too radical a measure.  Later on, however, Sweden did 
introduce a similar program.  See INGER, supra note 4, at 224. 
112 See INGER, supra note 4, at 165.  Social democracy first was introduced as a concept in Germany.  In the Nordic 
countries, social democratic parties progressively formed—1871 in Denmark, 1887 in Norway, 1889 in Sweden, and 
1899 in Finland.  See id.; Socialdemokraterna, at http://www.socialdemokraterna.se/Templates/Page____6591.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2006). 
113 In fact, less than twenty-five percent of male voters actually could vote—and no women—as a direct effect of the 
qualifications in the Swedish Constitution.  See INGER, supra note 4, at 186.  Even though the political development 
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between 1880 and 1909 can be described in terms of class conflict, characterized by demands for 
increased democracy against the conservative regime.114  Only in the 1910s did Sweden see 
change and social democrats were able to establish themselves in the parliamentary system.  All 
the Nordic countries experienced the emergence of welfare states.  
The Swedish welfare state was characterized by the introduction of “Folkhemmet” or the 
“Common people’s home.”115  This concept was of German origin and stood for the idea that the 
state should look after and take care of its citizens.116  In the words of former Swedish Prime 
Minister Per Albin Hansson (1885-1946): 
A good home knows of no privileged or suppressed, and of no favorites or 
stepchildren.  No one looks down on others, and no one tries to gain advantages 
from others’ weaknesses, the strong do not repress or loot the weak.  In a good 
society, there is equality, care, co-operation, and willingness to help.117
 
Tax revenue allowed the government to fund increased pensions, health insurance, 
accident insurance, disability and retirement insurances, unemployment insurance, 
unemployment boards, and favorable loans for housing.118  Social democrats also enacted new 
Family Codes, regulating everything from marriage to the parameters for government 
intervention in a family to take custody of children.119  It was an attempt to reach harmony on all 
                                                                                                                                                             
during the nineteenth century thus shifted power from the King to the Parliament and the Cabinet, conservative 
forces could still control most of parliament.  See id. at 170-71.  By 1921, Sweden had established the right to vote 
for both men and women.  See id. at 188-89. 
114 See Sven Eliaeson & Sidonia Jedrzejewska, Neo-Liberalism and Civil Society. Swedish Exceptionalism and 
Polish Pluralism., European Civil Society Network CiSoNet, Presented at Conference on Markets and Civil Society 
in Europe, Madrid, (Sep. 23-25, 2004), at  
http://www.asp-research.com/Papers%20CiSoNet/MADRIDSEPT%20(1).pdf, 16 (work in progress) (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Neo-Liberalism and Civil Society].  Workers, for example, fought for the right to 
organize themselves and the introduction of union agreements.  The tension reached its peak in 1909 when, because 
of the ongoing class conflict, a national strike involving over 300,000 workers was called.  See INGER, supra note 4, 
at 227. 
115 See Eliaeson & Jedrzejewska, supra note 114, at 7. 
116 See id. 
117 Socialdemokraterna, supra note 112 (translated by the author). 
118 See INGER, supra note 4, at 224, 285; see also Socialdemokraterna, supra note 112; Lag om Arbetslöshetsnämnd 
[Unemployment Boards Act], SFS 1944:475 (Sweden). 
119 Föräldrabalken [Family Code], SFS 1949:381 (Sweden). 
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levels in the labor market, in the family, and between state and civil society.120  In this process, 
all Nordic countries centralized state power and applied large-scale solutions.121  With time, the 
distinction between state and civil society eroded.122   
As a parallel to—and tied to—the social democratic parties’ increased political influence, 
the Nordic countries experienced the globalization of The Social.  One original and expounding 
example of The Social’s impact on Nordic legal theory is the development of labor law, which 
contains many corporatist features and which historically has been heavily regulated and more or 
less completely isolated from general contracts law.123   
Labor law was among the first areas in which the legislature intervened to preempt 
inequalities.124  This occurred, for example, in the early twentieth century, when legislation 
forced employers to include social insurance for industrial accidents in wage bargaining.125  In 
addition, the legislature enacted statutes addressing labor accidents and protection against 
evictions during labor conflicts.126  Nevertheless, workers, employers, and the government still 
divided the labor market.  A process of cooperation started when the forces of the labor market 
settled.  In Sweden, this happened in 1938, when unions entered into a collective bargain with 
employers, the so-called “Saltsjöbadsavtalet.”127  Both sides understood that in order to avoid a 
                                                 
120 See, e.g., ALVA MYRDAL & GUNNAR MYRDAL, KRIS I BEFOLKNINGSFRÅGAN (Stockholm, Bonnier, 1934) (in 
which they suggested that citizens together should take part in carrying the costs of, for example, raising a child). 
121 See Eliaeson & Jedrzejewska, Neo-Liberalism and Civil Society, supra note 114, at 7.  
122 For a general critique, see GUNNAR MYRDAL, HUR STYRS LANDET? (Stockholm, Rabén & Sjögren, 1982); see 
also Eliaeson & Jedrzejewska, Neo-Liberalism and Civil Society, supra note 114, at 7; Åke Daun, Välfärd inte bara 
offentlig service – Europa som negativ kontrast till folkhemsbygget, 19; Kennedy, supra note 3, at 657 (describing 
how The Social did not see that they were “eroding the distinction between law and politics.”). 
123 See Wilhelmsson, supra note 12, at 77. 
124 See id. (describing how several protective elements developed much earlier in labor law than in other areas of 
law). 
125 See id. at 76; Kennedy, supra note 3, at 653.  Sweden enacted a Workers Compensation Act in 1901, 
compensating work related injuries, and a voluntary Social Insurance Act in 1910.  See INGER, supra note 4, at 224. 
126 See, for example, Lag med särskilda bestämmelser om försäkring för olycksfall i arbete av vissa tjänstepliktiga 
m.m. [Insurance Regulations of Workrelated Accidents for certain Employee Groups], SFS 1943:182 (Sweden); Lag 
om skydd mot vräkning vid arbetskonflikter [Protection Against Evictions in Strikes], SFS 1936:320 (Sweden). 
127 See INGER, supra note 4, at 287; see also Socialdemokraterna, supra note 112. 
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collapse of production, they had to work together.  Strife and class war were outdated because 
they ignored the inherent interdependence between labor and capital; in other words, society 
needed to find harmony.128  Together, unions and employers entered into collective agreements, 
disregarding individual and formal criteria of contract making by binding non-union members 
and, thus, marginalizing the will theory.129  Moreover, labor and management councils were 
vested with the power to make legally binding regulations.130
This marked the start of a lasting period of consensus and détente in the Swedish labor 
market.  The Swedish legislature allowed the parties in the labor market to develop their own 
solutions, as long as those solutions produced results.  A comprehensive regime of corporatism 
grew out of this close cooperation between unions and employers.  It was not until the 1970s that 
the unions started demanding legislative intervention in order to force development.131  Sweden 
has not, to date, enacted any legislation providing for minimum wage, leaving it to the unions 
and the employers to agree.  Employer duties, contained in labor contracts growing out of this 
period, included retirement benefits, paternity leave, and employment insurances.132   
Whereas labor law was heavily regulated and developed progressive solutions to socio-
economic problems, mainstream contracts law was left untouched.  Intervention was limited to 
specific cases where abuse of weaker parties occurred.  One can identify two dominant trends 
from a welfarism perspective.  Case law expanded the reach of court intervention and the 
legislatures took action in casu against specific market malfunctions.   
                                                 
128 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 653-54. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. at 653. 
131 See Eliaeson & Jedrzejewska, Neo-Liberalism and Civil Society, supra note 114, at 18; INGER, supra note 4, at 
286-87 (describing this development and the history of the Lagen om Anställningsskydd [Employment Protection 
Act], SFS 1982:80 (Sweden)). 
132 See Landsorganisationen, at 
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Through case law, the courts broadened welfarism and increased intervention in contract 
relations.  As a first step, courts came to use section 33 of the Contract Acts to establish a general 
“duty of disclosure.”133  In Finland, the leading Supreme Court case came in 1949, concerning 
information about the condition of a machine for sale.134  The same year the Swedish Supreme 
Court ruled that a duty exists to inform contracting parties about surprising and onerous 
conditions in contracts.135  That case concerned an arbitration clause that was integrated into a 
contract through reference to a standard contract.136
Courts also developed a general right and power to adjust unfair contract terms.137  
Several cases established this right to modify or set aside obviously unfair terms.138  After a long 
discussion in Finland that persisted well into the 1950s, scholars started to agree that by 
analogizing to the unfairness clause in section 8 of the Promissory Notes Act,139 one could 
recognize a general principle of adjustment of “manifestly unfair contracts.”140  In Sweden, the 
Supreme Court decided the leading case, Köksmåla,141 in 1948, where a lease made by the 
Swedish Forest Council was found to contain unfair terms.142   
For their part, the Nordic legislatures introduced several mandatory laws as reactions to 
the existing conditions of the relevant markets.  To help develop urban areas, renting of 
dwellings and leasing were regulated; for example, Finland passed a Land Lease Act in 1902 and 
a Rent Act in 1925.143  The legislatures adopted Insurance Contracts Acts in response to the 
                                                 
133 Wilhelmsson, supra note 12, at 73. 
134 See id. at 73 n.8 (citing NJA 1949 II 258 (Sweden)). 
135 See BERNITZ, supra note 4, at 247. 
136 See id.  (citing NJA 1949 p. 690 (Sweden)). 
137 See BERNITZ, supra note 4, at 241. 
138 See id. 
139 For the Swedish version, see Promissory Notes Act, supra note 95. 
140 Wilhelmsson, supra note 12, at 81. 
141 NJA 1948 p. 138 (Sweden). 
142 See BERNITZ, supra note 4, at 241 n.2. 
143 See Wilhelmsson, supra note 12, at 76-77. 
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unhealthy insurance practices that were widespread in the 1920s.144  Additionally, regulations 
addressed disclosure practices, double insurances, and time limitations.145  A Promissory Note 
Act also was adopted in Sweden in 1936 and in Finland in 1947.146   
Because the core of contracts law was left untouched and because attempts to limit 
freedom of contract were seen as reactions to problems, Wilhelmsson describes these mandatory 
rules as “reactive welfarism.”147   
D. Particulars of The Social in the Nordic Countries 
 The unique characteristics that led the Social to develop a bias for social democracy and 
mixed market economies in the Nordic countries are hard to identify.  Where continental 
European countries saw the emergence of Fascist regimes, the Nordic countries prospered in 
social welfare democracy.  This may well have been largely accidental; at least Sven Eliaeson 
observes that no real reason exists for why Sweden only got the good out of what could have 
been so bad.148  His analysis is, to some extent, also true for the other Nordic countries. 
First, Eliaeson identifies that the Swedish system is a system of class compromise:  
“Socialized consumption and monopoly capitalism . . . [exist in] consensual cooperation, with a 
high degree of involvement of organized interests . . . .”149  There are many examples of 
successful corporatist solutions and egalitarian ambitions.150  Second, no real checks and 
balances exist in the Swedish Constitution.  Sweden has no tradition of judicial review and, 
hence, no Constitutional Court.151  In fact, the distinction between constitutional order and 
                                                 
144 See id. at 77; see also Lag om Försäkringsavtal [Insurance Contracts Act], SFS 1927:77 (Sweden). 
145 See Wilhelmsson, supra note 12, at 77. 
146 See Promissory Note Act, supra note 95; Wilhelmsson, supra note 12, at 81. 
147 Wilhelmsson, supra note 12, at 86. 
148 See Eliaeson & Jedrzejewska, Neo-Liberalism and Civil Society, supra note 114. 
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democracy is relatively absent.152  The Swedish democracy is extremely monistic and unfit for 
countries like Belgium, Germany, or Bosnia, Eliaeson believes.153  Finally, Sweden’s 
authoritarian and top-down system is built from comprehensive social engineering.154  Swedes 
are ignorant of the dangers of “Rousseauan populism.”155  Rousseau understood democracy to 
have totalitarian elements and, at least to some extent, to conflict with the notion of liberty.156
The early twentieth century also saw the emergence of Scandinavian Realism.  At the 
time American Realism was evolving in the United States, Scandinavian scholars undertook a 
similar project.157  Scandinavian Realism was a reaction to legal science and its undemocratic 
effects.158  Throughout history, the Nordic countries have been autocratic and conservative, with 
weak liberal traditions.159  Society was very hierarchical and the aristocracy exercised great 
power.160  Even in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and for a long time thereafter, strong 
conservative biases existed.161  The Nordic countries had a democratic deficit.   
Both Classical Legal Thought and The Social maintained that existing legal norms were 
real and unchangeable.162  Deduction from history, and reconstruction through deduction of what 
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153 See id. 
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ought to be, worked as justificatory concepts.163  From their emergence in the first part of the 
twentieth century, Scandinavian Realists showed how this approach to law actually gave legal 
science a conservative purpose and effect.164  The Realists established that Classical Legal 
Thought and The Social both involved elements of abuse of deduction.165  Legal concepts such 
as Right and Force were impossible to define in specific cases and the result was powerful; legal 
concepts were not scientific, but they were under human control.166  The method used by 
Scandinavian Realists to achieve democratization was legal positivism.  By removing the 
unscientific parts of legal science, scholars and judges’ sphere of power over legal science 
decreased.167  This shifted legal decision-making powers from legal scientists and judges to the 
popularly elected legislatures.168  As a result, elected politicians could gain power and take 
control of legal politics.169   
E. Maturing Welfarism and The Third Globalization 
 The Third Globalization can be used to explain current legal developments in the Nordic 
countries.  While the reception of the Third Globalization at the periphery, which includes the 
Nordic countries, is still underway, the Third Globalization links legal, political, and economic 
events to a historical process.  In so doing, it provides for important insights about the changes 
and conflicts of Nordic legal theory. 
A first observation concerning the reception of the Third Globalization in the Nordic 
countries is that it has been asymmetrical.  Whereas policy analysis has received much attention 
and caused a progressive development, neo-formalism has met strong resistance.   
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Policy analysis made its entry in the early 1970s, and had wide impact.  Rules had 
allowed for court intervention “in an all-or-nothing fashion.”170  Rules conferred on courts either 
the power to intervene or no power to intervene.  As legislation through principles became more 
frequent, courts’ powers expanded.  Yet, in case law, courts continued to show reluctance toward 
making active use of principles.  This was true in the case of principles or general clauses in 
contracts law.  It was not until the 1970s, when legislation introduced general clauses that were 
more powerful, that there was a major shift and courts’ power to intervene became real.171  
Principles providing for balancing appeared throughout the legal systems; in Sweden and 
Finland, legislation through principles appears under the name framework laws or elastic 
norms.172  This development cleared the way for decisions of ad hoc compromises, which give 
relevance to circumstances in casu.173  
From the perspective of contracts law, the most significant development in policy 
analysis perhaps came in 1975.  After a common Nordic effort to renew legislation, there were 
three important developments: a principle of general consumer protection, a principle on 
adjustment of unfair contracts, and a clear goal to “secur[e] the real functioning of protective 
measures.”174  Legislation provided for an assessment procedure of what is most fair in each 
individual case and, consequently, delegated power to intervene to change the contract in line 
with that assessment.  This was the next major step in welfarist contracts law: “maturing 
welfarism.”175  Wilhelmsson characterizes maturing welfarism as a utilitarian consideration, a 
system providing for a maximum amount of protection in each individual case.176  The general 
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clause of the Contract Acts, common section 36 (“Section 36”), combines all these features.177  
All Nordic countries adopted Section 36 with some variances.  The Swedish version reads: 
A contract term may be adjusted or held unenforceable if the term is unreasonable 
with respect to the contract’s content, circumstances at the formation of the 
contract, subsequent events, or other circumstances.  If the term is of such 
significance that it shall otherwise be unenforceable in accordance with its 
original terms, the contract may also be adjusted in other respects or held 
unenforceable in its entirety. 
With respect to the application of the first paragraph, special consideration shall 
be given to the need for the protection of consumers and others who assume an 
inferior position in the contract relationship. 
The first and second paragraphs shall be given similar application to terms in 
other legal relationships than that of contract.178  
 
With the introduction of Section 36, courts increasingly used their powers to intervene in 
contracts cases.179  This intervention had been the legislatures’ intent; the Finnish legislature, for 
instance, articulated the goal to “increase the willingness of the courts to adjust unfair contracts . 
. . ” in the preparatory works to Section 36.180  In addition, the Swedish version of Section 36 
necessitated consideration of “the need for protection of consumers and others who assume an 
inferior position . . . .”181  The increased intervention led to the establishment of a supplementary 
judge-made body of interpretative rules, a development best embodied in today’s strong legal 
principle in Nordic contracts laws of allowing for court interference in contractual relations.182
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More specifically, Section 36 expanded the criteria to consider when establishing whether 
a contract was valid.  Courts were no longer limited to considering only the formalities of 
contract formation.  Preparatory works, case law, and market practice laid out the idea that a 
contract’s validity was dependent on substantive considerations.183  To determine validity, courts 
were required to examine what a contract materially incorporated.184  A contracting party’s 
personal relationships and social status could affect the outcome of a case.185  In practice, Nordic 
courts increasingly chose to intervene, and consumers and small businesses were more likely to 
receive relief.186  In Ulf Bernitz’s words: “The courts have been given considerable freedom of 
action in handling this sanction, and in case law, the courts have often used adjustment to alter 
unfair features of contract terms so as to be able to assess them as fair.”187   
Recent contributions to the evolution of policy analysis and contracts law include some 
degree of “person related need-rational welfarism.”188  The focus of review has shifted and is 
now set on the material substance of the contract, making the judging principle each party’s 
economic and social position and need.189  The rules establish, for example, “social force 
majeure” of a party as a cause for paternalistic intervention.190  There are several examples of 
such tendencies in Swedish statutory law, including section 8 of the Interest Act, section 2 in 
chapter 6 of the Torts Act, section 32 of the Consumer Credit Act, and section 25 of the 
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Consumer Insurance Act.191  Moreover, preparatory works contain many guidelines for courts on 
what policy concerns and what social problems to consider when applying relevant legislation.  
Case law has further established that social problems may sometimes be cause to limit liability 
for a weaker party.192  Even some standard contracts contain clauses accepting severe illness or 
other similar circumstances as a reason to escape contract liability.193
There were many other progressive developments in Nordic contracts laws in addition to 
policy analysis.  Sweden adopted a Consumer Services Act in 1985,194 providing far-reaching 
protection for purchasers of services.195  In Finland, the government has created a Legal 
Committee with representatives from both industry and commerce.196  When asked, the 
Committee gives reasoned opinions on unfairness of contract terms.197
Additionally, policy analysis reception through EC law and the incorporation of 
European Convention included a widening of national courts’ ability to adjudicate on general 
principles of law.198  For example, Sweden has recognized the proportionality principle and the 
Supreme Court established its universal reach in 1995.199  The Supreme Administrative Court 
also has applied the principle of proportionality in a number of cases200 concerning restrictions 
on owners’ use of real property.201   
Distinct from the enthusiastic reception of policy analysis, the Nordic countries have 
demonstrated great reluctance toward neo-formalism, the second part of the Third Globalization.  
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Only with the help of political neo-liberalism and globalization, and only when framed in terms 
of economic necessity, was neo-formalism able to gain influence in the Nordic legal systems:  
European integration allowed judicial supremacy and human rights to establish themselves.  
However, as the later parts of this article will show, the reception of neo-formalism to this day is 
incomplete and contested.   
Like other welfare states, the Nordic countries depend on free trade and the abolishment 
of trade barriers for their survival.  Their wealth is directly proportional to their trade, and they 
all rely on a competitive and strong industry to pay for welfare expenses and to keep their 
economies vital.  Acting on this presumption, in 1960, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark were 
among the founding fathers of the European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”).202  Finland 
joined the EFTA as an associate member in 1961 and Iceland joined in 1970.203  Whereas EFTA 
provided the Nordic countries with the benefit of free trade areas, it did not come without 
stipulations.  In particular, the EFTA required deregulatory measures and privatizations in the 
market.  This started a trend in the 1970s, in the aftermath of the Oil Crisis, which led to 
increased dismantling and privatizing of welfare services in the Nordic countries.204   
At about the same time, political neo-liberalism evolved as a legitimizing factor to the 
deregulatory movement.  Neo-liberals promoted market independence in relation to the state.205  
They claimed that the model of increasing governmental expenditures, as proposed by John 
Maynard Keynes (1883-1946), was incapable of addressing economic recessions.206  One 
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example put forward by neo-liberals was the failure of national economies to handle the Oil 
Crisis.   
In Sweden, the single most significant event influenced by the neo-liberal movement may 
have been the deregulation of the credit market, sometimes referred to as the “November 
Revolution.”207  On November 21, 1985, the National Bank deregulated the Swedish credit 
market.208  The Government stated that this measure was a natural part of the ongoing 
modernization of economic politics.209  Previously, the Government had actively directed and 
controlled banks’ profits and risk taking.210  Swedish National Economist Lars Jonung describes 
the event as the most far-reaching reorganization of the National Bank’s currency policy in post-
World War II Sweden,211 and Kjell Olof Feldt, the Swedish Treasurer at the time, believes that 
with this decision Sweden gave up one of the most symbolic means for sheltering the economy 
from undesirable market forces.212  From a social democratic perspective, this deregulation was a 
great defeat to neo-liberal ideology.213   
Another area affected by neo-liberalism and global free trade was the currency market.  
The Nordic countries could no longer defend the value of their currency and, at the same time, 
retain and develop a competitive industry.  Eventually, all the Nordic countries had to switch to 
floating exchange rates.214
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Neo-liberalism also provided for a way to privatize social welfare.215  For instance, until 
the 1980s, Sweden provided for health care as part of social services.  One could describe the 
system in terms of doctors supplying a state service from which patients needing care and help 
benefited.  With neo-liberalism, the perspectives shifted.  Patients became consumers who were 
now buying a service; through elected representatives in parliament, the patients ordered the 
health care.216  This implied certain rights for the patient-consumer and certain duties for health 
care providers.  In addition, efficiency became an important concept in heath care services.217  
Another example of privatized welfare includes the trend to contract out public services.  Where 
the Government earlier had owned the companies that provided services, now, through public 
bidding, private companies bid to provide the service for a given price.  Public transportation, 
health care, and day care all were contracted out. 
Ultimately, during the 1980s, joining forces with the EU, either as member states or 
through closer cooperation, became necessary for all the Nordic countries.218  The EU had 
become a solution to economic difficulties.  In its EU application in July 1991, Sweden named 
economic reasons as the decisive factor in its decision to join the EU.219  “It is determinative for 
Sweden’s economic strength and welfare that Sweden can continue to take part of Western 
European integration,” the Government explained to the Parliament in its proposition concerning 
the EU application.220  At the time, after years of changing economic conditions, Sweden was in 
the midst of its worst economic crisis in modern history.  Today, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland 
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are members of the EU, and both Iceland and Norway work closely with the EU through the 
EFTA and the European Economic Area (“EEA”) agreement.221   
With the EU, neo-formalism made its entry into the Nordic legal systems.  For Denmark, 
this process came about much earlier than in the other Nordic countries because Denmark had 
been a member of the EU since 1973.222   
The most obvious neo-formalist development resulting from the EU membership was the 
reception of judicial supremacy.  As part of becoming members of the EU, Member States are 
subject to the quasi-federal judiciary, in the form of the ECJ.223  For the EEA states, Norway and 
Iceland, the EFTA Court has a similar role.224   
The ECJ has jurisdiction to interpret EU treaties and EC legislation.225  The ECJ handles 
cases in two primary areas.  One, the ECJ continuously checks Member State compliance to EC 
law.226  Two, the ECJ ensures that all Member States apply EC law in a uniform manner.227  
Cases decided by the ECJ thus take precedence over decisions by Member State courts.228  The 
ECJ may hear cases with EC institutions, Member States, companies, and individuals as parties. 
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Member States also must accept and incorporate the acquis communautaire, the body of 
legal rules developed with the EU.  The EU treaties and the accessions treaties regulate how to 
apply the acquis communautaire.229  There exists, however, a general obligation to apply and 
implement EC law effectively and a duty for courts to interpret and apply national law in 
compliance with EC law.230  The principle of interpretation in EC law should guide, and be the 
basis for, Member State court decisions.231   
With the incorporation of the acquis communautaire, judicial review increased in the 
Nordic countries.  Courts must give EC law precedence over a conflicting national provision; it 
follows logically since the national “provision is decided by an instance[, the Member State 
legislature] no longer has the competence to decide the norm.”232  This is a clear development 
from the earlier prevailing model that included limited judicial review.  Under the Swedish 
Constitution, courts have the power to disregard unconstitutional provisions enacted by the 
Parliament or the Cabinet only if that provision is manifestly in conflict with the Constitution.233  
Swedish courts, therefore, have greater powers of judicial review when applying EC law; where 
EC law is silent and national law governs, however, limited judicial review remains.234  
Two leading Swedish cases recognizing EC law supremacy have been decided by the 
Supreme Administrative Court.  In the 1997 case Lassagård, the Court established that where 
Swedish law conflicts with EC law, Swedish law should be set aside.235  The next case, 
Upplands Lokaltrafik, found that national provisions inconsistent with an EC Directive are 
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void.236  The Court directly referred to ECJ case law,237 such as Van Gend en Loos238 and 
Simmenthal.239
Another development in the Nordic legal systems stemming from European integration 
involves human rights.  Sweden incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention”) in January 1995.240  Finland incorporated the 
European Convention in 1990, Denmark in 1992, and Norway in 1999.241  The Convention 
enumerates several fundamental rights and freedoms.  Parties to the treaty bind themselves to 
secure the enjoyment of these rights and freedoms within their jurisdiction.  Moreover, the 
European Convention establishes a European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”).242  The Court 
has jurisdiction over cases concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention, and 
the Court has developed an extensive case law over the years.243   
Bernitz suggests that, together, these developments have increased judicial protection for 
individuals in Sweden.244  In this sense, Constitutional Law has become more vital.  As Bernitz 
states, “the accession to the EU can be said to have upgraded the role of the law in Sweden and 
the importance of the judiciary.”245   
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F. Two Notes on the Third Globalization  
Two aspects about the Nordic reception of the Third Globalization are striking.  Both 
have to do with the legislatures and, thus, the social welfare policies of all the Nordic countries.  
First, one can attribute the legislatures’ thorough incorporation of policy analysis to the special 
legal status of preparatory works in the Nordic legal systems.  Second, the Nordic legislatures 
have actively resisted the increased importance of rights in the Nordic legal systems.   
As described above, policy analysis was the first part of the Third Globalization in the 
Nordic countries.246  Policy analysis was what transformed from The Social receiving swift and 
straightforward implementation.  The legislatures saw many advantages to policy analysis—
general clauses in the context of contracts law.  Earlier attempts to intervene in the market had 
been both over- and under-inclusive and sometimes produced awkward results.247  With policy 
analysis, intervention could be more pragmatic and on a case-to-case basis.248  Policy analysis 
became progressive law-making to the Nordic countries.   
Perhaps the main reason why the reception of policy analysis came so easily to the 
Nordic countries was that the legislatures believed they could control the outcome of policy 
analysis in case deliberation through preparatory works.  For instance, through general clauses 
the legislature delegated broad powers.  Section 36 of the Contract Acts was no exception.  
Under Section 36, courts had the power to intervene if a party to a case showed a weakness 
leading to an unbalanced contract.249  For the Nordic legislatures, an important concern about 
delegating power to the courts was how to safeguard effective protection of weaker parties and 
how thus to attain a social welfare outcome.  Put differently, there were no guarantees for what 
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courts would do with their broad powers.  Legislative delegation had to be conditioned, and 
preparatory works played an important role.   
Preparatory works are a primary legal source in the Nordic legal systems.  They include 
guidelines and explanations for laws as well as concrete and specific examples of adjudicative 
outcomes.  In his book, Avtalsrätt,250 Lars Erik Taxell describes the use of preparatory works in 
the Nordic legal systems: 
Even a very specified and detailed legal norm will be applied to practical 
situations that differ greatly from each other—this is a consequence of the 
increased complexity of economic life.  Therefore, when applying or interpreting 
legal norms, a judge needs support of principles and the norms’ underlying goals.  
Preparatory works and, therein, reiterated legislative comments consequently 
integrate with a norm’s binding effect.  Preparatory works highlight, materialize 
and explain legal norms and thus provide tools to help their legal application.  The 
clearer and more detailed the legislative comments are, the stronger the 
legislatures’ influence over legal application.251
 
The Swedish preparatory works to Section 36 of the Contract Acts contain numerous 
examples of how and when to apply the general clause.252  They illustrate various market 
situations and contract terms, analyzed and evaluated from the standpoint of unfairness.253  For 
instance, the works include example contract terms that give a stronger contracting party 
discretion to act, examples demonstrating where a party is discriminated against, and examples 
where a party reserves the right to decide on a particular issue.254   
The Bergman & Beving case illustrates how the courts relate to the preparatory works to 
Section 36.255  In that case, concerning a contract between a small business and a larger 
corporation, the Swedish Supreme Court stated: 
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Whether . . . [in a case, a small business is in an inferior position,] depend[s] . . . 
on the overall judgment of the contract situation which according to various 
statements in the travaux preparatoires [(preparatory works)] to . . . [Section 36] 
of the Contract Acts ought to be the basis for determining whether or not a 
contract term is to be regarded as unfair.256   
 
In sum, the special status of preparatory works in Nordic legal systems proved to be a 
useful tool for the legislatures when legislating with general clauses.  Indirectly, social policies 
expressed in the preparatory works supplemented general clauses and, thus, allowed the 
legislatures to set up frameworks for court balancing.  Contracts law deliberation could thereby 
entertain balancing between conflicting policies such as freedom of contract and intervention257 
and give consideration to social inequalities and social problems.258   
Both Taxell and the Draft Legislation Advisory Committee (“Law Council”) have 
criticized legislation through preparatory works.259  One critique is that particular examples and 
political preferences expressed in the preparatory works aim to give the courts a limiting 
framework.260  This limiting framework, however, does not bind courts; they can go any way in 
deliberations.261  The framework is only illusory and general clauses vest strong powers with 
courts.262    
When the Swedish Government drafted the new Contract Acts, the issue of legislation 
through preparatory works was brought to the fore; an open conflict of interest arose concerning 
the application of Section 36.  Carl Lidbom, the Swedish Attorney General at the time, 
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demanded a “modification threshold for terms of contract.”263  Conversely, the Law Council 
made clear that “the principal rule must remain that a contract must be adhered to.”264  
According to the Law Council, the “numerous statements in the travaux preparatoires 
[(preparatory works)] involving judgments from the point of view of unfairness were only to be 
regarded as examples providing guidance.”265  With time, these statements would lose their 
relevance as public policy changed.266  Carl Lidbom had the last word, wanting the courts to 
change their views: “this clause is designed to encourage the courts to take a different view of 
the matters involved here.”267   
On the issue of rights protection, Bernitz has been a strong critic of the protection of 
human rights provided for in the Nordic countries.268  All of the Nordic countries were among 
the founding fathers of the European Convention and, formally, their conviction to promote 
human rights always has been unquestionable.269  Nevertheless, the Nordic countries have been 
reluctant to implement and incorporate the Convention into national law.  Behind this inaction 
lies a broad political resistance, especially among social democrats.270  In Sweden, the ECtHR 
was not allowed jurisdiction until 1966, and for many years the European Convention remained 
unimplemented.271  Only in 1995 did Sweden incorporate the Convention into law, although still 
with several conditions.272
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One such condition was that the Social Democrats agreed to incorporate the European 
Convention in so far it did not strengthen courts’ power of judicial review.273  The liberal and 
conservative parties agreed to this concession to secure the Social Democrats’ approval to 
incorporate the Convention.274   
In addition, the European Convention does not have constitutional status in Sweden 
because the Parliament enacted the Convention as a law.  Some statements in the preparatory 
works to the implementing law of the European Convention establish an interpretation priority 
for the Convention and the Swedish Constitution contains a reference to “Sweden’s undertakings 
under” the Convention.275  In principle, however, any subsequently enacted law can take 
precedence.276  The Swedish Parliament and Cabinet retain the power to legislate away the 
protection of the European Convention.277   
Not surprisingly, Nordic courts are generally positive toward rights.  It was the courts, 
especially the Supreme Court, which led the process of strengthening the European Convention 
and ECtHR case law in Sweden.278  In the 1980s, the Supreme Court actively began to interpret 
Swedish legislation in accordance with the Convention and ECtHR case law.279  The Court based 
its decisions on “the principle of treaty conform interpretation.”280  In a case from 1992, the 
Supreme Court indicated that the interpretation principle should apply even when the outcome 
would be contrary to prior Swedish case law or legislative history.281
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III. CONTRACTS LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The European Union expressed its intention to harmonize contracts law in 1989.  In a 
resolution from June 1989, the European Parliament (“Parliament”) requested the European 
Council, the European Commission (“Commission”), and the Member States to initiate work on 
a common European code of private law.282  No comprehensive measures were actually taken 
until July 2001.283  At that time, the Commission adopted an Action Plan entitled 
“Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European 
Contract Law.”284  The Action Plan aimed to initiate “a process of consultation and discussion 
about the way in which problems resulting from divergences between national contract laws in 
the EU should be dealt with at the European level.”285  Specifically, the Communication 
intended “to allow the Commission to gather information on the need for more far reaching EU 
action in the area of contracts law.”286  It emphasized several issues: whether cross-border 
contracts caused problems to the internal market; whether diverse national contract laws 
hindered cross-border transactions; and whether sector-specific harmonization of contracts law 
caused inconsistencies.287   
After receiving and considering responses to the first action plan, the Commission 
adopted a new action plan in 2003: A More Coherent European Contract Law Action Plan.288  
The new action plan has three aims: “to increase the coherence of the EC acquis in the area of 
contract law, to promote the elaboration of EU-wide general contract terms and to examine 
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whether to adopt non-sector specific measures such as an optional instrument.”289  Though the 
new action plan dropped the goal of developing a European Contracts Code, there is an 
expressed strategy by the Commission to increase harmonization activity in contracts law. 
On a practical level, the EU started adopting directives concerning specific areas of 
contracts law in 1985.290  The EC has adopted several directives since 1985.  The most relevant 
to this article are the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC),291 the Directive on Contracts 
Negotiated Away from Business Premises (85/577/EEC),292 the Directive on Consumer Credits 
(87/102/EEC),293 the Package Tours Directive (90/314/EEC),294 the Unfair Contracts Term 
Directive (93/13/EC),295 the Distance Contracts Directive (97/7/EC),296 the Sale of Consumer 
Goods Directive (99/44/EC),297 and the Directive on Electronic Commerce (2000/31/EC).298  All 
these directives concern particular situations—specific contracts or marketing techniques—that 
have been identified as requiring harmonization.299
These directives aim at leveling out existing disparities between Member States within a 
certain area of contracts law.  The legal bases used by the EU Legislature to adopt directives are 
Article 94 and Article 95 of the Treaty of the European Community (“TEC”).300  Together these 
articles provide the EC Legislature with power to harmonize contracts law in response to 
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problems in a market sector relating to trade between Member States; disparate contracts laws 
are trade barriers and cause for intervention, the argument goes.301   
The best explanation of the function and limits of Article 95 harmonization is the 
Tobacco I decision.302  Measures based on Article 95 must have as their objective to “improve 
the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market.”303  There also must 
be a “finding of disparities between national rules and of the abstract risk of obstacles” to the 
fundamental freedoms or the possibility of distortions of competition.304  Such future obstacles 
to trade must be likely to occur and the measure “must be designed to prevent them.”305
Separate from the above-discussed processes of legislative activity within the realm of 
the EU are many private initiatives.  The most noteworthy of these initiatives are the Lando 
Commission, the Common Core Project, the Social Justice Group, and the Study Group for a 
European Civil Code.306  These initiatives aim to research and promote the understanding of 
contemporary contracts law in the different Member States.  Some of the initiatives draft 
proposals for a European Contracts Code; others try to identify and articulate the general 
principles of a future European Contracts Code, lobby their particular agendas to the 
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Commission, or work to promote public awareness.307  The Lando Commission is responsible 
for the Principles of European Contract Law (“PECL”).308  Even though the PECL have no legal 
force in and of themselves, they represent an account of European contracts law.  Practitioners 
and courts often use the PECL as a reference and a source of inspiration.  Their authority is 
similar to that of the American Restatement in Contract Law.309
A. A European Contracts Code 
Against this background, the EU is working toward a unified European contracts law.  
What concerns this article is the protection of weaker parties in such a future law.  There exists 
no final law to examine, but by examining various contracts law directives adopted by the 
Council, it is possible to predict general principles of a European contracts law.  The directive on 
unfair contracts terms is the most relevant act to this prediction.  Whereas all other contracts law 
directives are limited to certain sectors, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive applies to all 
contracts between a professional and a consumer.310  Additionally, the Directive also shares a 
similar view of protection of weaker parties with the PECL.311  From studying the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive, one therefore gets an indication of what legislative techniques and 
principles the EU will use to provide for protection of weaker parties in a code.  Article 3 is the 
article most relevant to the protection of weaker parties in the Directive: 
1. A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be 
regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a 
significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the 
contract, to the detriment of the consumer.  
2. A term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated where it has 
been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence 
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the substance of the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard 
contract.  
The fact that certain aspects of a term or one specific term have been individually 
negotiated shall not exclude the application of this Article to the rest of a contract 
if an overall assessment of the contract indicates that it is nevertheless a pre-
formulated standard contract.  
Where any seller or supplier claims that a standard term has been individually 
negotiated, the burden of proof in this respect shall be incumbent on him.  
3. The Annex shall contain an indicative and non-exhaustive list of the terms 
which may be regarded as unfair.312
 
There are two ways to establish a contractual term as being unfair by the use of the 
Directive.  Paragraph 1 contains a general clause containing criteria of when and how a court 
shall deem a contract term unfair.313  To supplement the general clause, paragraph 3 refers to a 
list of unfair terms, found in the annex to the Directive.314
The general clause, at first glance, seems to provide for a great deal of intervention.  This 
is, however, deceiving, as its reach is limited to not individually negotiated terms that cause a 
significant imbalance, contrary to good faith.315  First, paragraph 2 defines an individually 
negotiated term as a term that one party drafts ahead of time, and which substance the other party 
cannot control.316  By only allowing courts to interfere when a contract is not individually 
negotiated,317 “contracting parties [are free] to conclude the contract which most suits their 
particular needs.”318  The emphasis of this rule is on the principle of freedom of contract and the 
virtue of private autonomy in a laissez-faire society.319  The belief is that “control of individually 
negotiated contracts … [is] in conflict with private autonomy and the functioning of a market 
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economy.”320  Courts and other authorities, consequently, only have the power to intervene with 
predefined—not individually negotiated—contract terms in standard contracts.321  Wilhelmsson 
observes, “[p]rivate autonomy and freedom of contract… [will] be left untouched as soon as they 
have been made use of in some form of negotiation, irrespective of the balance of power of those 
taking part in the negotiation.”322  In sum, the aim of the general clause found in Article 3, and in 
a future code, is only to protect the free will of weaker parties, leaving weaker parties on their 
own when they have negotiated because those parties have made use of their free will.323
For a term to be unfair, it must cause a “significant imbalance” between the parties’ rights 
and obligations.324  A similar requirement existed in earlier general clauses in Nordic contracts 
laws.  For example, before Section 36 of the Swedish Contracts Law Act was adopted, a term 
had to be “obviously unfair” before a court could intervene.325  With the introduction of Section 
36, the Swedish legislature deleted the word “obviously.”326  Since then, a term may be unfair if 
it merely causes, to use the words of the Directive, imbalance between the parties’ rights and 
obligations.  Where in this case the EC Directive requires a significant imbalance, it represents a 
retreat in attitude concerning intervention.  The message given is that courts should abstain from 
intervening in contract relations. 
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Moreover, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive introduces good faith as a limitation by 
requiring any significant imbalance to be “contrary to the requirement of good faith.”327  
Consequently, even though the facts of a case may establish a significant imbalance between the 
parties’ rights and obligations, courts’ authority to intervene is constrained by the good faith 
principle.328  One can conclude that intervention in a future code does not aim to promote 
equality between the parties. 
As a supplement to the general clause, courts can also find a term unfair if it is included 
in the list provided for in paragraph 3.  It should be noted initially that the language in paragraph 
3 is remarkably ambiguous: a self-described “indicative,” “non-exhaustive” list of terms that 
“may” be unfair.329  Yet it is the legislative technique and the origin of this paragraph, and not 
poor legislative quality in its drafting, that should draw our attention.   
The list is a so-called “gray list.”  In Advocate General Geelhoed’s words, a gray list 
contains “terms which are presumed to be unfair, but for which the burden of proof is in fact 
reversed.”330  Not every use of a term on the list will cause an imbalance in a contract 
relationship.331  A “black list,” by comparison, includes terms “which are regarded as unfair and 
in relation to which courts or competent administrative authorities do not have any discretionary 
power.”332  The EC legislature found inspiration for using such a list from the German Standard 
Contracts Act of 1976.333   
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The list has a twofold objective.  On one hand, the list aims both to direct and to limit 
courts by giving examples of unfair terms.  “The list thus offers the courts and other competent 
bodies . . . a criterion for interpreting the expression unfair terms.”334  One fear, expressed by the 
Danish legislature among others, is that a list containing specific examples might narrow the 
scope of court intervention to such listed terms and decrease the protection already provided for 
in general clauses.335
On the other hand, the list signals to the market what may be acceptable, that is, what is 
not categorically prohibited.  Because a gray list allows for certain exceptions, market actors will 
find ways to use gray-listed terms and courts will be limited in their review of such terms.336  
Effects of such an approach will manifest themselves over time, and despite the amount of 
criticism the gray list has received, a future European contracts law likely will include gray lists.  
Some Member States, such as Germany, have implemented the list as a binding black list,337 
others as an indicative gray list, and some only included the list in the preparatory works of their 
law.338  Furthermore, some Member States use even more restrictive techniques than lists; they 
“only allow specific [enumerated] contract clauses to be struck down . . . .”339
IV. COMMISSION V. SWEDEN 
The historical description of contracts law in the Nordic countries in Part II shows that 
there has been a continuous development toward increased protection of weaker parties closely 
related to the political and social changes of Nordic society.  This development is comprised of 
four different periods, to use Wilhelmsson’s terminology: emerging welfarism, reactive 
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welfarism, maturing welfarism, and person related need-rational welfarism.340  All four periods 
of welfarism coexist and supplement each other today.  Person related need-rational welfarism 
represents, however, the most recent tendencies within the legal regime of protection of weaker 
parties.341  In addition, Nordic contracts laws deem anyone who is in an inferior position to the 
other party as a weaker party; for instance, a consumer or a small business dealer could be a 
weaker party. 
A future European contracts law, described through this article and through other 
scholars’ analyses of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, provides protection of weaker parties 
similar on its face to that afforded in the Nordic countries during the period of emerging 
welfarism—early twentieth century legislation.342  Moreover, European contracts law shifts the 
standard of who to consider as a weaker party.  In the EU, a weaker party is a well-informed and 
educated individual.  He or she must understand the risks involved in entering a contract, have 
the ability to collect information, and be articulate enough to make his or her claims heard.  A 
weaker party in the EU is thus a market actor 
On the surface, the Nordic countries appear to have a much broader system providing for 
protection of weaker parties, and therefore, rightfully, they need to make no, or almost no, 
changes to existing contracts law in response to EC harmonization efforts.  Contracts law 
regulations in place provide for similar or better results.  This is the reason why many scholars 
have connected problems experienced within the Nordic legal systems to the retreat to emerging 
welfarism that European contracts law brings about.  Thus, these scholars believe that the 
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problems within the Nordic legal systems are caused by the decreased protection of weaker 
parties.  The implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and the subsequent case, 
Commission v. Sweden, however, challenge this perception.   
Building on the well-developed tradition of Nordic legal cooperation, the implementation 
of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive was a common Nordic effort.  The Swedish preparatory 
works state:   
The effort to transpose the Directive has taken place on a Nordic level.  The goal 
has been to have a common interpretation of the Directive and establish universal 
principles for transposing the Directive domestically.  Because regulations on 
unfair contract terms are very similar in the Nordic countries, it has been a natural 
goal to synchronize transposing measures so that no unnecessary differences 
occur.  All Nordic countries have been involved, including Iceland.343   
 
There were three components to the Swedish implementation of the Directive.  First, a 
revised Consumer Contract Terms Act was enacted.344  The revised Act conserved significant 
portions of the old act but introduced, for instance, an expanded scope of application.345  Second, 
the only change made to Section 36 of the Contracts Act was the introduction of a reference to 
the adjustment clause, section 11 of the revised Consumer Contract Terms Act.346  Finally, 
Sweden implemented the list in the annex to the Directive in the preparatory works to the 
implementing law.347   
In 1999, the Commission brought Sweden to court for failure to implement the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive.348  The Commission also, under authority granted to it by Article 226 
of the TEC, issued “reasoned opinions . . . against Denmark and Finland for the same reason.”349  
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The EFTA Surveillance Authority expressed that it would take action against Norway if the 
Commission prevailed in the case against Sweden.350  Both Denmark and Finland chose to 
intervene in support of Sweden in the proceedings.351  
The Commission argued in its brief to the Court that Sweden must reproduce the list in 
the annex in section 3 of Article 3 in the laws implementing the Directive.352  Specifically, the 
Commission said that the Directive has two goals: first, to approximate Member States’ 
consumer provisions on unfair terms in contracts; and, second, to improve information on 
applicable law to consumers.353  For the Commission, it is necessary to publish the list in law, in 
order to achieve the two goals as well as satisfy the requirement of legal certainty.354  Advocate 
General Geelhoed described legal certainty in his opinion to the case: “individuals should have 
the benefit of a clear and precise legal situation enabling them to ascertain the full extent of their 
rights.”355  The Commission thus argues that to fulfill these obligations, a “mere mention in the 
preparatory work for a law cannot suffice.”356  It is doubtful whether preparatory works are as 
easily accessible as laws are and whether the public is made aware of the existence and 
importance of the list through preparatory works.357   
Sweden defended its implementation method, relying in its argument on Article 249 of 
the TEC, which grants Member States discretion to choose the form and method of 
implementing directives.358  In making its case, Sweden expressed four reasons why it was a 
more “suitable solution” to incorporate the annex into the preparatory works of the implementing 
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law.359  First, “the annex to the Directive … is not in itself intended to create rights and 
obligations for individuals.”360  Advocate General Geelhoed purported this view in his opinion to 
the Court; he described the Directive as containing one normative part and one indicative part.361  
Whereas the list is of indicative value and Member States only have to transpose normative 
provisions into their legislation, Sweden’s implementation was sufficient.362   
Second, in the Nordic countries, preparatory works are one of the main legal sources.363  
By incorporating the list into the preparatory works, the list can be of help when applying and 
interpreting the relevant law.364  Sweden argued to the court: 
When the Directive was being implemented, the question of the list in the Annex 
was the subject of extensive discussion.  According to a legal tradition well 
established in Sweden and common to the Nordic countries, the preparatory work 
is an important aid to interpreting legislation.  The incorporation of the Annex to 
the Directive in the preparatory work thus seemed the most suitable solution.365
 
Moreover, Swedish legislative texts rarely contain lists of examples.366  Reiterated in the 
preparatory works, the list will be an interpretative source to the adjustment clause.   
Third, Swedish courts already had declared fourteen out of the seventeen terms in the 
annex unfair at the time the ECJ heard the case.367  Case law was, therefore, already in harmony 
with the Directive.  Furthermore, throughout the court proceedings, the Commission could not 
give a single example where Sweden had failed to designate a term unfair.368   
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Fourth and finally, “members of the concerned public are informed of … [the list’s] 
existence in various ways.”369  In sum, Sweden argued that whereas Member States only are 
obliged to implement directives in a way compatible with their own legal framework, Sweden 
had sufficiently implemented the Directive.370  
In its holding, the Court stated that “it is essential that the legal situation resulting from 
national implementing measures be sufficiently precise and clear and that individuals be made 
fully aware of their rights so that, where appropriate, they may rely on them before the national 
courts.”371  The list in the annex “does not limit the discretion of the national authorities to 
determine the unfairness of a term . . .” and “[i]t in no way alters the result sought by the 
Directive . . . .  It follows that . . . the full effect of the Directive can be ensured in a sufficiently 
precise and clear legal framework without” incorporating the list into the implementing 
provisions. 372   
The court also quoted Advocate General Geelhoed’s opinion: 
Inasmuch as the list contained in the Annex to the Directive is of indicative and 
illustrative value, it constitutes a source of information both for the national 
authorities responsible for applying the implementing measures and for 
individuals affected by those measures….  Member States must therefore, in order 
to achieve the result sought by the Directive, choose a form and method of 
implementation that offer a sufficient guarantee that the public can obtain 
knowledge of it.373
 
The Swedish Government has claimed that preparatory works are an important interpretative tool 
and that they are easily accessible.374  In relation to implementing the Directive, the Government 
asserted that it made the list available to the public in various ways.375  The Commission failed 
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to establish the contrary, and instead, “confined itself to maintaining that those factors cannot 
compensate for the fact that . . .” Sweden did not integrate the list in the implementing laws.376  
The Court ruled that the Swedish model of implementation makes individuals sufficiently aware 
of their rights, and consequently, Sweden cannot be required to implement the list into law.377
A. The Discussion within Sweden 
 In the preparatory works to the law implementing the Directive, the Swedish Government 
discussed different possibilities of implementation.  First, the Government identified two positive 
effects of incorporating the list in the annex directly into law; such an incorporation would make 
the list more easily accessible and would facilitate interpretations of the law in many cases.378  
Nevertheless, where the Directive provides that contract terms in the list “may” be unfair, the 
Government concluded that it would be pointless to prescribe the list of contract terms in law if 
the terms were not always binding.379   
Second, the Government looked at alternative solutions in implementing the list.  One 
solution was to change the terms in the list into mandatory terms through prohibiting 
exceptions.380  Such a solution, however, would have made individual review of a contract term 
in an individual case impossible.381  An alternative solution would have been to incorporate the 
list into law, but conditioning it.  The list would be binding “if no particular circumstances to the 
contrary exist.”382  In that alternative, the list would not give any guidance in complicated 
cases.383  Moreover, such an implementation would have caused misunderstandings.  For 
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instance, courts might believe that they should avoid considering as unfair contract terms not 
included on the list.384   
With these aspects in mind, the Government found that the best solution for 
implementing the list into Swedish law was by incorporating the list into the preparatory works 
of the implementing law.  The Law Faculty Board at the University of Stockholm wrote an 
opinion to the proposed draft preparatory works, expressing concern over the risk of courts 
overlooking the list if not incorporated into law.385  Because the Government considered the 
reasons against incorporating the list into law predominant, this risk was worth taking.386  
Additionally, the Government noted that the implementing law would be equipped with a direct 
reference to the Directive and, as a result, court adjudication would take the Directive into 
consideration.387  In the end, all Nordic countries chose this method of implementation.388   
B. The Law Council’s Comments 
 During the implementation process of the Directive, the Swedish Government requested 
the Law Council to comment on the draft for the new law.389  In its comment, the Law Council 
recognized the special legal character of the list and pointed to several features.   
First, Swedish tradition dictates that the Government should enact into law lists 
containing recommendations that purport to bring about a uniform application or assist in 
forming future case law—like the list of the annex.390  In this case, the Government, therefore, 
could not rightfully claim that the list has been “incorporated into Swedish Law.”391   
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Second, where the preparatory works to the implementing law incorporates the list, a 
court cannot use the list as an interpreting factor when applying the relevant section concerning 
unfair contract terms; in Swedish legislation, the clause relating to unfair terms is Section 36 of 
the Contracts Act.392  When assessing possibly unfair terms under Section 36, therefore courts 
only will consider the preparatory works to Section 36 itself.  When implementing the Directive, 
however, the only change made to Section 36 of the Contracts Act was the incorporation of a 
reference to the assessment provisions of the implementing law.393  
In Marleasing SA v. La Commercial International de Alimentacion SA, the ECJ decided 
that courts must interpret national law in accordance with EC law.394  This means that Swedish 
courts are obligated to include the Directive as an interpreting factor when applying Section 
36.395  The result is that the list will have sufficient impact, though not because of its 
incorporation into the preparatory works of the implementing law.   
Third, the Law Council agreed with the Government that the terms in the list are vague 
and for many reasons are not suitable for legislating.396  Finally, it is most likely that Courts 
would already hold the terms included on the list unfair by application of Section 36.397   
C. Remarks on the Discussion of Commission v. Sweden 
From the Nordic legislatures’ perspective, there is no question that Nordic contracts laws 
materially fulfilled the implementation requirements of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.398  
After all, the Directive caused little disturbance in Nordic contracts laws—largely because the 
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laws in place already contained well-developed legislation and case law that provided for 
equivalent results.  The legislatures’ argument was that the Directive was redundant.  The 
concepts of individually negotiated terms, significant imbalance, and good faith already were 
well established in the Nordic countries.  In fact, the Nordic countries considered themselves 
leaders in providing for protection in line with these concepts.   
The list was different by virtue of the legislative technique used; Sweden had to transpose 
it into Swedish law in one way or another.  Transposing the list into the preparatory works 
allowed the legislature to retain its control while also implementing the list.  The legislature was 
well aware that its implementation model was borderline insufficient; not only did it comment on 
this possible insufficiency in its internal discussion, but also the critique from the Law Council 
recognized it.  Moreover, Sweden had notice from precedent; when Denmark tried to implement 
a directive into a preparatory works in 1985, the Commission brought Denmark to the ECJ for 
failure to implement the directive and the ECJ found against Denmark.399  In Commission v. 
Sweden, the ECJ distinguished its reasoning from the Danish case on the grounds that the list of 
presumptively unfair terms only provided information to private citizens and did not create any 
rights or duties by itself.400   
The analysis of the Nordic implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
suggests that the Commission was right.  Although Nordic contracts laws many times provide for 
outcomes similar to that required by the Directive, it is only through the interpretative obligation, 
as reaffirmed by the ECJ in Marleasing, that a party can rely on, or the courts can give full effect 
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to the Directive in adjudication.401  Commission v. Sweden thus visualized a dilemma between 
the Nordic countries and the EU institutions.   
V.  ANALYSIS AND NORDIC LEGAL DEBATE 
 Part I of this article laid out Kennedy’s theory of globalizations of law and legal thought, 
comprised of Classical Legal Thought, The Social, and the Third Globalization.  Kennedy’s 
theory gave a global perspective that this article used to analyze the historical and current Nordic 
legal debate. 
The Nordic countries received Classical Legal Thought at the end of the nineteenth 
century and during the early years of the twentieth century.  Nordic contracts laws from this 
period were filled with freedom of contract features, and protection of weaker parties was limited 
to secure each party’s will.   
Next, until the 1970s, The Social heavily influenced legal forces in the Nordic countries, 
allowing parliamentary supremacy, social conceptualism, and corporatism to prosper.  Contracts 
law during this period shaped a wide-ranging regime of welfarism; this period saw the 
emergence of informalities, strong biases for welfare considerations, and contracts rules laden 
with paternalist motives.  Another important element from this period for the current Nordic 
legal debate was the emergence of Scandinavian realism, which first played an important role in 
democratizing law-making in the Nordic countries and later was a dominant factor in the 
enthusiastic reception of The Social in the Nordic countries.   
When the Third Globalization, comprised of policy analysis and neo-formalism, evolved, 
the Nordic legal systems, heavily inspired by The Social, had no trouble in receiving policy 
analysis.  Part II of this article laid out how case law had established the proportionality 
principle, and how Section 36 of the Contract Acts made a prima facie case of policy analysis 
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legislation.  However, neo-formalism met strong resistance in the Nordic countries and gained 
strength only through European integration, primarily through the Nordic countries’ accession to 
the EU.  For example, Sweden partly introduced federalism and judicial supremacy through the 
EC Treaty and the acquis communautaire when joining the EU in 1995; Sweden’s 
implementation of the different directives on contracts law reintroduced freedom of contracts and 
formalism; and Sweden incorporated the ECtHR—property rights and human rights—into law in 
1995.   
Although parts of neo-formalism have been introduced to the Nordic legal systems, 
incorporation of those parts is at best incomplete and is generally insufficient.  The reason for 
this is that the Nordic countries claim redundant the legal influences coming with neo-formalism 
and, specifically, European contracts law.  In Part III and Part IV, the article outlined the present 
Nordic mind-set toward European contracts law.  Where Part III explored the contents of a 
European contracts law and highlighted differences in relation to Nordic contracts laws, Part IV 
illustrated how the Nordic countries implemented the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, how they 
argued, in Commission v. Sweden that the Directive was redundant to Nordic contracts laws, and 
how they insufficiently implemented the Directive.  My discussion in Part IV, however, shows 
that neither the Unfair Contract Terms Directive nor neo-formalism is redundant.   
Neo-formalism causes many disturbances to the Nordic legal systems.  First, neo-
formalism re-establishes coherence within the legal system, from which one can deduce rights, 
and grants courts the power to protect rights—in this case, freedom of contracts, but also 
property rights and human rights—in contrast to the earlier prevailing order of an informal 
parliamentary-made regime of collective welfare.  Second, neo-formalism introduces a federal 
level of governance with powers to decide policy, specifically, the Commission and the ECJ, and 
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removes policy-making powers from the former sovereign Member States.  Third, with neo-
formalism the judiciary is supreme and, thus, takes the place of parliaments.  Because European 
contracts law represents part of the reception of neo-formalism in the Nordic countries, it 
requires Nordic legal institutions to subject themselves to a new balance of formal powers.  
Arguably, the claim that harmonization of contracts law decreases protection of weaker 
parties stems from the assumption in the Nordic countries that their contracts law is more social 
in the law of the market and this claim is employed by the Nordic countries to resist, and to 
justify resistance of, European contracts law.  Resistance takes place as Nordic legal institutions 
strive to preserve the Nordic legal systems’ informal and arbitrary characteristics whenever they 
are incorporating EC legislation or ECJ case law.  Indeed, this mind-set is prevalent everywhere 
in Nordic legal debate.  All arguments and claims originate from the presumption that the Nordic 
legal systems embody social welfare, intervention, and informality (“social”); whereas the EU 
stands for economic liberalism, deregulation, and formalism (“liberalism”).  Political biases 
determine the positions and arguments made at each side of the social versus liberalism 
dichotomy.   
Here follows a summary of the dichotomy within Nordic debate, though it is not an 
attempt to be comprehensive.   
A. Social  
 At the social side of the dichotomy, one can summarize the arguments as a strong 
preference for informal and wide-ranging Nordic legislation over formal and stagnated EC 
legislation.  First, looking at how legal debate views the Nordic legal systems, the Swedish 
Government argued in Commission v. Sweden that the Unfair Contracts Term Directive was 
redundant.  The Government claimed that Swedish law already held the terms in the list in the 
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annex to the Directive unfair.  Advocate General Geelhoed supported that claim by stating that 
Swedish case law already had declared fourteen out of the seventeen terms in the annex unfair 
and, more interestingly, the Commission could not give a single example where Sweden had 
failed to designate a term unfair.402  All these arguments presume that the Nordic legal systems, 
which are flexible and dynamic and which give judges broad powers to balance and intervene in 
cases, already provide for every possible adjudicative outcome.  Whether it is rights, principles, 
or judicial supremacy, the system in place can secure the same outcome as a formal system and, 
at the same time, be flexible.  If this should prove insufficient, the argument goes, the legislature 
can always intervene to supplement or correct legislation. 
Second, what is most striking about the image of the EU at the social side of the 
dichotomy is the great fear of neo-liberal ideology.  The Nordic countries have a long tradition of 
intervention and social purposes.  Scholars are concerned that once the EU has harmonized 
contracts law, initiatives could only come through the cumbersome democratic process of the 
EU.403  Harmonization of contracts law means that any area covered by EC laws “would be 
removed from the powers of the national states,” because EC law is supreme over Member State 
law.404  Member State legislatures thus will no longer have policymaking powers or power to 
respond to socio-economic changes.405  Whereas European contracts law is enacted to promote 
ideas such as trade, market economy, and efficiency, there will be no room for social welfare 
concerns.   
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A third concern is the conflict between a uniform European contracts law and the idea of 
welfarism, because welfarism is not a single idea around which one can construct a code406 and 
is not reducible to a single coherent formula.407  Rather, welfarism requires a combination of 
various welfarist regulations.408  Wilhelmsson explains: “one needs to take a stand on various 
questions on an issue-by-issue and case-by-case basis.  The variety . . . implies that the 
solutions[, or rules,] are necessarily too political, too decisionistic, to be carved out in stone once 
and for all.”409  Welfarism requires a “continuous experimental development and improvement . 
. . where new ideas not only flow via EC legislation, but also directly between the Member 
States.”410  Logically, this is impossible if a uniform European contracts law controls contracts in 
the EU; hence, legal development would stagnate under European contracts law.411  Any 
measures taken on a European level of government must therefore leave “sufficient room for 
continuous development at a national level.”412
Fourth, another common perception about European contracts law is that because all 
Member States within the EU, to some extent, have different legal cultures, one will have to 
search for common values on which to base a contracts law. 413  The regime of protection of 
weaker parties in Nordic contracts laws has been “connected with the relatively homogeneous 
[welfarist] values of those able to influence them.”414  Among the different Member States in the 
EU, however, there are no homogeneous social values to build upon, but rather, a multitude of 
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different social groups and conflicting interests.415  A European contracts law therefore will be a 
race to find common traditional values.416  An aggravating factor is the “natural tendency … 
[among] governmental experts to defend the positions of their own legal systems and the 
consequent need to search for compromise solutions.”417  In sum, Nordic legal debate perceives 
European contracts law to be very abstract, construed out of concepts, and containing no 
homogenous welfarist idea.418   
Finally, whereas the legal basis for EC legislation is trade barriers caused by disparities in 
Member States’ legislation, EC legislation necessarily will disrupt the flexible and interventionist 
system in place and will cause great insecurity.  In the case of European contracts law, it will 
replace over 100 years of case law.419  EC law codification hence implies a shift from “judge-
made law to black-letter statutes.”420  It “took [Nordic] judges and legal theorists decades to 
build up the progressive, flexible and pragmatic system of today,”421 all of which will be 
exchanged for European contracts law.  Although, most importantly, given the need for uniform 
application, it is unavoidable that the ECJ bears the sole responsibility for ensuring legal 
development.422  Harmonization thus strips Member State courts of their powers.  Swedish 
Supreme Court Judge Torgny Håstad explains that if national courts are left in charge of 
developing case law, there is a great risk that disparities in application will once again 
develop.423  Bigger countries also would likely influence case law more than smaller countries 
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because they have more cases.424  The only solution for a free market is to leave it to the ECJ to 
take on the role of norm creator and supreme judiciary. 
B. Liberalism 
On the liberalism side of the dichotomy, Nordic debate focuses on how European 
“formal” legislation can increase the wealth and growth of the market, in combination with a 
strong critique of the existing “informal” Nordic legal systems.   
First, to achieve an efficient and working market, one needs a European contracts law 
with uniform rules.425  Member States’ contracts law is too interventionist and too disparate for 
businesses.  Only with a uniform law can market actors adopt business routines applicable 
indiscriminately throughout the EU.426  In the words of Ole Lando: 
The Union is an economic community.  Its purpose is the free flow of goods, 
persons, services and capital.  The idea is that the more freely and more 
abundantly these can move across the frontiers, the wealthier and happier we will 
become.  All of these move by way of contracts.  It should, therefore, be made 
easier to conclude and perform contracts and calculate contract risks.427
 
Second, the EU allows for highly technical and efficient solutions in comparison to local 
Nordic legislation.  With European contracts law, there exist increased possibilities to entertain 
the demands of trade and economy.428  Lando explains: “[c]ontract law is not folklore.  It is a 
question of ethics, economics and technique.”429  As a conclusion, it must follow that one could 
draft a contracts law with “common principles favorable for the economy and technically 
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expedient.”430  To sum up, European contracts law is a project of democracy, market economy, 
and Christian ethics and, therefore, a plausible and desirable goal.431   
Third, Nordic legal debate often refers to EC law as strengthening legal certainty.  Under 
a system of rule of law, individuals must know and must be able to rely on the legal 
consequences that will result from their actions.  A harmonized system of rules such as a 
European contracts law will increase legal certainty because market actors will no longer run the 
risk of having different Member States’ rules apply to similar contracts.  Stig Strömholm gives 
an illustrative description: “People living inside the EU shall be able to rely on the legal 
framework surrounding the Union, foresee the legal effects of their actions, and have the 
freedom of choice to enter into dispositions.”432  The enactment of a European contracts law will 
improve legal certainty for consumers and businesses as these parties increasingly take part in 
cross-border trade.433   
Fourth, the EU minimizes state intervention in the market to predefined exceptions.  In 
short, neo-liberals believe that intervention causes more disturbance than good for the market 
and, hence, the state shall avoid intervening.  Not only does the market have to be protected from 
intervention, but so do individuals; protection is necessary to secure the free enjoyment of 
individual rights.  Rights like freedom of contract and the right to property are sacred.  Implicit 
in this claim, European contracts law embodies the principle of freedom of contract and allows 
only for clear and foreseeable exceptions.  In his article, Swedish Standard Contracts Law and 
the EC Directive on Contract Terms, Bernitz emphasizes the importance of limiting paternalistic 
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court intervention.434  Any social concerns or protective measures should be contained to 
specific problem areas.435  The best way to achieve this is with mandatory rules regulating such 
problem areas.436  Whereas the principal consumer protection goal is information to consumers 
in EC contracts law,437 the EU reproduces the image of minimized court intervention.   
Fifth, because EC law will use standardized models for finding solutions to conflicts, 
court deliberation on a case-by-case basis will decrease.438  In his book, Avtalsrätt, Lars Erik 
Taxell foresees that formalism will increase with a European Contracts Code.439  EC Directives 
might very well already have initiated this process.  Concerning the “gray list” in the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive, Bernitz identifies a possible shift in court deliberation from an 
individualized assessment to a more “clause-oriented” assessment of contracts.440  The focus of 
assessment thus will be on specific contract clauses, not the individual circumstances of the 
case.441  With time, Bernitz believes this will increase the efficacy of the system.442   
VI. CONCLUSION 
 Because of the social versus liberalism dichotomy and its presumptions about the EU and 
the Nordic legal systems, Nordic legal institutions have resisted European contracts law and have 
mitigated the disturbances caused by it.  Formal issues of institutional competences have been 
blurred into substantive issues of policy and, thus, allowed the Nordic countries to avoid the 
legal choices coming with European contracts law.   
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For instance, in the case of protection of weaker parties, Nordic legal institutions mitigate 
the consequences of European contracts law by claiming that harmonization decreases 
protection.  In making this claim, legal institutions transform the issue of which institution has 
the formal power to legislate and decide contracts law policy—the EC legislature or the Member 
States’ legislatures—to one of substance.  Specifically, the issue becomes who has the best 
policy and what is the substantive outcome of such a shift to European contracts law.   
The claim presumes that Nordic contracts laws are better as informal and paternalistic.  
The true concern of Nordic legal institutions is resistance to giving up legislative powers to the 
EU and, in contrast to what one might believe, Nordic legal institutions are not concerned with 
what will happen with protection of weaker parties.   
Through a perspective of globalization of law and legal thought, this article lays out how 
harmonization of contracts law represents part of the reception of the ongoing globalization in 
the Nordic countries.  The perspective helps to identify and trace disturbances coming with 
European integration, in this case, to the Nordic legal systems.   
Moreover, this perspective allows for a brief prediction of what is to come.  On the one 
hand, the Nordic countries are likely to experience an increased amount of cases and reasoned 
opinions against themselves.  This will arise from their non-implementation of EC Directives, 
the fact they do not recognize principles and rights established by ECJ case law, and the 
perception that their continued use of informal criteria creates barriers to the free movement of 
goods, services, people, and capital.  On the other hand, this analysis suggests that European 
contracts law will not cause protection of weaker parties to decrease.  Rather, European contracts 
law leaves ample space for the development of far-reaching consumer protective measures. 
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